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Financial crisis exposed the bad state of European public finance. Budget deficits are so 
domesticated in Europe, that it is hard nowadays to encounter a budget surplus, or at least 
a balanced budget. Greece once again entered the history, but this time Greeks have 
absolutely nothing to be proud of. Financial crisis has reintroduced phenomenon known 
only from war periods – heavily indebted rich countries. European Union never imagined 
such situation could occur and threaten the existence of the Eurozone, so there was no 
plan B prepared. 
In the thesis we would like to analyze the process of finding the plan B. Hundreds of 
billions euro were spent on bailouts of heavily indebted Eurozone Members. Using case 
studies of the most affected Eurozone economies we want to decide if the Euro was the 
cause of the European debt crisis. In the last part we will discuss institutional changes of 
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Finanční krize odhalila špatný stav Evropských veřejných financí. Rozpočtové deficity v 
Evropě natolik zdomácněly, že už se dnes prakticky nesetkáme s rozpočtovým přebytkem 
nebo alespoň vyrovnaným rozpočtem. Řecko znovu vstoupilo do dějin, ale tentokrát 
nemají být Řekové vůbec na co pyšní. Finanční krize znovu nastolila fenomén známý 
pouze z období válek – těžce zadlužené bohaté země. Evropská Unie si nikdy ani ve snu 
nepředstavila, že by taková situace mohla nastat a ohrozit existenci celé Eurozóny, takže 
nebyl nachystán žádný plán B. 
V práci bychom chtěli analyzovat proces hledání plánu B. Stovky miliard euro byly 
utraceny na záchranu těžce zadlužených členů Eurozóny. Za pomoci případových studií 
nejhůře postižených ekonomik Eurozóny chceme rozhodnout, zda bylo Euro příčinou 
dluhové krize. V poslední části budeme diskutovat institucionální změny v EU určené 
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During the last decade, world economy was thriving and most economists predicted a longterm 
growth. Then, all of the sudden, world economy was hit first by a food crisis, and consequently 
with the financial crisis. The financial turmoil combined with a severe recession in United States 
resulted in the crisis , which is by its extent   unprecedented since the major crisis in 1930's. 
Thanks to globalism of financial markets, the reaction of  European markets was immediate. 
Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis in United States, the crisis came to Europe. One of the early 
victims was The Republic of Iceland, which didn't survive the collapse of its three major banks 
and after the unsuccessful bank nationalization it found itself incapable of facilitating its external 
debt and went bankrupt.  
Banking sector was a source of troubles for numerous European economies. Many of them 
sustained extreme losses and some of them like Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis bank, or Anglo 
Irish had to be nationalized or bailed-out. As a result of recession in Europe and costly state 
interventions, some EU countries are in despair and facing serious risk of bankruptcy. Those 
countries were nicknamed “PIIGS”. The case of Ireland is probably the most sad one, because it 
was considered a Celtic tiger just a few years ago and nowadays they have to cope with an 
unemployment rate similar to Turkey.  
In my work, I would like to propose some economic policies and institutional changes in order to 
stop the situation from repeating. Those theoretical findings will be backed by the case study of 
PIIGS countries and Hungary. I chose Hungary, because it is a non-Eurozone country, facing 
similar problems. The emphasis will be put on the role of Euro in those economies. The other 
important aspect of my study will be the role of budget deficits and relevance of Maastricht 
criteria in the framework of contemporary European Union. I would like to discuss the idea of 
revision of Maastricht criteria and the possibility of excluding problematic countries from the 
Eurozone. As we have witnessed in the case of Greece, there are incentives to manipulate 
economic data and the following political and economical costs are immense.  












2. Financial crisis is the main cause of fiscal problems of sample countries: 
3. Maastricht criteria and membership in Eurozone needs to be revised: 
4. EU countries in Eurozone were better-off during the crisis than other EU members: 
5. There is a need for an independent EU body, that would supervise fiscal policies of member 
states: 
 
For a purpose of my research I will use mainly  a theoretical approach. My theories will be based in 
particular on the case study of six EU countries.   
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Until the outburst of Sovereign debt crisis in Europe, sovereign defaults were typically 
associated with poor and developing countries. Rich and developed countries defaulted 
only during war periods and the Great Depression in 1930’s.  
At the beginning of the financial crisis no one imagined the recession being so hard.  
Financial crisis immediately spread worldwide. Europe suffers from a poor state of public 
finance, and thanks to the financial crisis this problem got even more exposed. Recession 
caused a high unemployment and the increasing unemployment rate created pressure on 
social security systems. Many European economies encountered high primary deficits and 
the sovereign debt started to rise sharply. It was the start of the European sovereign debt 
crisis.   
The First European of financial crisis was Iceland, which had to default on part of its 
banking liabilities. Insufficient banking sector regulation combined with the high foreign 
exposition of banks lead to catastrophic results after the credit crunch in the United States. 
Icelandic banking sector was many times bigger than the economy of Iceland. The 
situation of Iceland repeated in Ireland, but with several differences. Ireland made an 
unfortunate guarantee for banking deposits after fall of Lehman Brothers, as nobody 
imagined the financial crisis being so serious. Moreover similarly to the United States there 
was a real estate bubble in Ireland. Thanks to bank guarantees Ireland ended up paying 
around 50% percent of GDP for a bank rescue and had to apply for emergency lending 
from the EU and IMF. In a short time Ireland turned from the economic miracle of Celtic 
Tiger to one of the biggest European debtors.  
Investors soon started to doubt sustainability of public finances in several Eurozone 
economies and the market panic spread like a fire. Some countries experienced sharp 
increase in cost of lending and became unable to rollover the maturing debt, thus facing a 
risk of bankruptcy. Those countries were nicknamed “PIIGS” according to their names. 
Portugual, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. As the market panis spread, soon economies 
of Italy and Spain became vulnerable. European Union together with the IMF decided to 
perform an unprecedented bailout in order to stop the sovereign debt crisis from further 
spreading, because economies of spain and Italy are too-big-to-fail, but at the same tim 
too-big-to-be-saved. Eurozone is both an economic and political project. It is na 
unprecedented project and important step in the process of European integration. Failure 
of Eurozone would have serious economic consequences and would set the integration 
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many years back. EU officials are prepared to save the Eurozone virtually at all costs. 
In my work, I would like to analyze by analyzing case studies why those Eurozone 
countries became so heavily indebted. There was a lot of pointing of fingers and accusing 
of different people and institutions, blaming them responsible for the ongoing crisis. 
Naturally as all of PIIGS countries are Eurozone Members the Euro is being blamed for the 
crisis. I would like to determine in my work if the Eurozone caused the ongoing European 
sovereign debt crisis, or it is just a coincidence. My findings will be backed by the case 
study of PIIGS. The emphasis will be put on the role of Euro in those economies and in 
two in-depth case studies of Ireland and Greece I will also analyze historical 
consequences. In the last part of my thesis I will analyze institutional improvements, which 




















1. European sovereign debt crisis 
 
Credit crunch in the United States in 2007 triggered a financial crisis less than a year later. 
The financial crisis has risen to such extent that it in some aspects exceeded the Great 
Depression in the 30’s. Thanks to globalism of the world economy and interconnectedness 
of financial markets, crisis had a severe impact all over the world, including Europe. Crisis 
has reintroduced a phenomenon typical only for war periods - highly indebted rich 
countries. Weakened financial sector and unsustainable public finances in Europe 
worsened by recession gave birth to the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Political heterogeneity of Europe has to step aside and the whole European Union needs 
to unite in order to stop the threat of contagion of the debt crisis and its further 
deterioration. Politicians can’t decide who should bear costs of the sovereign crisis – 
debtors, creditors, or wealthy Eurozone Members. 
 
1.1 Why has Eurozone problems 
 
How troubled economies became heavily indebted differs from country to country. In most 
cases the main reason was a bad state of public finance and/or irresponsible fiscal 
policies. There is nothing wrong about the sovereign debt itself, but he most important is 
whether those debts are sustainable. Financial crisis caused a market panic and the 
market panic made the previously sustainable debts unsustainable. Because single 
Eurozone countries can't undergo currency devaluation, they have to undergo the so-
called “internal devaluation”. Unlike the external devaluation, which uses inflation to ease 
up the debt problem and to restore competitiveness, internal devaluation restore 
competitiveness by strict austerity measures. Deficits can be financed through higher GDP 
growth, but in the present situation of recession followed by stagnation, alternatives needs 
to be used. Government can cut spending through budget cuts and fiscal reforms, and/or 
increase taxes. This makes the European Sovereign Debt Crisis different from all previous 
sovereign debt crises. During the previous crises could be used combination of both the 
currency and internal devaluation.  
Euro area is an unprecedented political project, which had some weakness, especially a 
lack of plan B. Stability and Growth Pact was supposed to deliver convergence and 
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stability within the Eurozone. As a result, politicians had an impression that Eurozone is 
protected from severe problems and prepared no backdoor plan in case of systemic crisis. 
SGP pact failed to protect Eurozone from unsustainable fiscal policies. In the end the 
Maastricht criteria were only to be followed by prospective Members, not the current ones 
as can be seen in the table bellow. 
 
Table 1: Deficits and debt 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Greece 
-3.4 -3.7 -4.5 -4.8 -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.4 
102.5 103.4 103.7 101.5 97.3 98.8 100.3 106.1 105.1 
Italy 
-1.7 -0.8 -3.1 -2.9 -3.5 -3.5 -4.3 -3.4 -1.5 
113.7 109.2 108.8 105.7 104.4 103.9 105.9 106.6 103.6 
Germany 
-1.5 1.3 -2.8 -3.7 -4 -3.8 -3.3 -1.6 0.3 
60.9 59.7 58.8 60.4 63.9 65.8 68 67.6 64.9 
France 
-1.8 -1.5 -1.5 -3.1 -4.1 -3.6 -2.9 -2.3 -2.7 
58.9 57.3 56.9 58.8 62.9 64.9 66.4 63.7 63.9 
Ireland 2.7 4.7 0.9 -0.4 0.4 1.4 1.6 2.9 0.1 
48.5 37.8 35.5 32.1 30.9 29.6 27.4 24.8 25.0 
Spain -1.4 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 1.0 2.0 1.9 
62.3 59.3 55.5 52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.1 
 
Source: Eurostat, IMF; (% of GDP) 
 
As a benefit of Eurozone accession, countries like Greece, or Portugal gained access to 
much cheaper funding than they were used to. Low interest rate and poor fiscal moral was 
a dangerous combination. The perceived risk by investors for Eurozone countries was 
lower, because all countries were supposed to follow monetary and fiscal rules. Because 
there was never any actual punishment for violating Maastricht criteria, those countries 
borrowed willingly. In 2010 only 5 countries didn’t breach the Maastricht criteria.  
Populism is one of the most typical features of European politics. The reasons are 
historical, as Europeans are used to big public sectors and extensive welfare state. In 
most European countries the term “budget surplus” was unheard of for decades. Buying of 
voters is a common feature across Europe and people got used to the fact that deficits are 
somehow natural and inevitable. It is hardly possible to liberate the fiscal policy from the 
political cycle. Debt ceilings are not an ideal solution as there is virtually no safe level of 
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debt. Also sometimes the debt increase might be a result of some natural disaster for 
example. Any fiscal restriction would need to factor in reasons for debt growth.  
Another European weakness is competitiveness. Many European economies suffer from 
high labor cost and low productivity. High labor costs are caused either by a high inflation, 
or a strong position of unions. Moreover in some countries wages are indexed, which 
further worsen the competitiveness and thus the economic growth. Another reason can be 
the inflation differential between the country and the Eurozone, because Euro area is not 
an optimal currency and some countries like Ireland or Spain were exposed to asymmetric 
positive shocks, as they rose faster than the rest of Eurozone. These positive asymmetric 
shocks can be evaded through restrictive fiscal policies. 
 
Figure 1: Growth and competitiveness 
 
 
Source: Smaghi (2011), pp.5 
 
Somehow controversial is the role of rating agencies in the crisis. The question is why they 
didn’t act sooner. Bad state of Greek public finance has been known at least since 2004, 
but nothing happened and it took five more years until it was recognized how serious are 





Figure 2: Sovereign ratings 
 
 
Source: Cantor and Packer (1995), pp.2. 
 
Sovereign ratings are by its nature much more complex than corporate ratings. Markets 
penalize equally rated bonds issued by sovereigns compared to corporate bonds. With the 
rating downgrade penalization rises sharply. (Cantor and Packer 1995) 
Financial crises causes a destabilization of financial markets and caused a deep 
recession, which deteriorated sovereign debt 
 
1.1.1 Ageing population 
 
Ageing population became a common feature of the modern capitalist civilization. It seems 
like a rule of thumb that with increasing GDP natality decreases. Despite some exceptions 
like Nordic countries or religious Ireland, majority of Western cultures suffer from a 
demographic implosion. Such a phenomenon is probably a result of rising standard of 
living, which in most cases is only attainable if both partners focus on building careers 
rather then raising a child. In order to earn sufficient income to keep a high standard of 
living, women especially work longer and harder than ever before. Simply put, nowadays 
they have a much less of time to have a child. Countries now rely heavily on immigrants, 
who have usually enough offspring to compensate for a low natality of native population. 
Apart from the low natality the average life span is increasing. Those two factors combined 
create an immense pressure on pension and healthcare systems. Most of the European 
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pension systems don’t factor in the demographic development, which will result in further 
worsening of primary deficits across Europe. 
 
Figure 3: Old age dependency ratio - projection 
 
Source: Eurostat, (EU-27) [Accesed 27.6. 2011]. 
 
In the graph above, depicting old age dependency ratio in the European Union can be 
noticed severity of the European ageing. According to estimates of the Eurostat, 
dependency ratio is going to double over following 50 years. EU will need to introduce an 













2. Saving the Eurozone 
 
“We have shown that where there is a will there is a way. And it is the European way. 
We have solved this in the European family, in the euro area."  
(José Manuel Barroso, Brussels, March 23th  2010) 
 
Financial crisis almost immediately spread from the United States and the world economy 
was hit by a deep recession. Soon after the burst of real-estate bubble in the US, the credit 
crunch repeated in Europe as several European economies also had an overheated 
property market. The most exposed economies to the property bubbles were Spain, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom. European banks had expositions in subprime mortgages 
both in the US and Europe. Credit crunch combined with recession further affected the 
state of the European financial sector. Deep recession also caused deterioration of already 
weak European public finances. Investors started to doubt the sustainability of some of the 
Eurozone Members’ economies. As the banking sector holds a large amount of the 
European sovereign debt, market panic started to spread and sovereign bond yields 
rapidly started to grow. Even though the ECB rate were set to a minimum value of 25 basis 
points. The recession was so deep that the monetary policy turned out to be ineffective. 
Economic recession caused an increase of unemployment and the increased 
unemployment further increased the pressure on public finances through social securities, 
which accounted for a large primary deficits. It was an outbreak of the sovereign debt 
crisis. The first victims were economies of Hungary, Latvia, and Romania, which applied 
for the Balance of Payments assistance. Financial problems of those countries were soon 
dwarfed by Greece. Once again Greece entered the history, but this time Greeks have 
nothing to be proud of. Greece was in a deep recession, facing high deficits and as the 
concerns about sustainability rose, it soon became unable to refinance the sovereign debt. 
Greece was facing a threat of sovereign default. Unlike other indebted countries, Greece 
couldn’t undergo currency devaluation, as it was a Euro area Member. The Eurozone and 
EU decided they would provide a financial assistance to deter the risk of default. The main 






Table 2: Greek debt exposition 
 
Source: Blundell-Wignal and Slovik (2010), pp. 8 
 
Apart form directly exposed France and Germany there was a high risk that the crisis 
might spread to Italy and Spain, which would mean an end of the Euro project. It is 
absolutely crucial to save Euro at all costs - both in political and financial sense, as it is 
symbol of the European integration and its end would set the integration many years back. 
Because of the weak banking sector, there was a fear that the sovereign default coultd 
trigger a domino effect and a cascade of defaults as was seen in the United States after 
the credit crunch. European politicians decided to avoid even using of the word default. It 
became unspeakable and was replaced by restructuring, and reprofiling. 
2.1. Bailing-out Europe 
 
Bailout is the easiest way how to protect country from sovereign default. European Union 
decided to extinguish a fire, yet it didn’t bother to handle the source of fire. European 
politicians chose to muddle through the crisis as it is more comfortable than negotiating 
and solving the problem.  One way or another, bailouts will be always paid by taxpayers. 
The only thing to decide is witch taxpayers should pay. 
European Union have several emergency financing mechanisms, but none of them was 
intended to be used by Eurozone Members and definitely not it the extent of hundreds of 
billions Euro as we see today. Politicians were so confident in success of the Eurozone 
project, that he European Union had no plan B. Financing needs of indebted economies 
were so high, that it was beyond capabilities of the IMF. Politicians had to react fast. For 
the simplicity reasons they chose to continue offering a financial assistance in order to 
protect Italy, Spain, and the whole banking sector. 
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2.2 Existing EU financial assistance instruments 
 
In this section will be explained why the European Union couldn’t use any of the existing 
facilities to bailout troubled economies. Surprisingly, before the debt crisis, there was no 
financial program designed to help Eurozone Member states. Until the European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) was created as a reaction to Greek crisis, all other 
programs were setup to help non-Eurozone, and non-EU countries. Nowadays, there are 
several different programs of financial assistances varying by its scope. 
European Commission may provide loans or lines of credit as a financial assistance to 
troubled Member States and in some cases to third party countries. All loans provided by 
The Commission are made on behalf of the European Union. If the assistance is needed, 
European Commission rise funds by issuing debt instruments in the capital markets. The 
reason why it is financed through capital market and not the EU budget is because the EU 
is not allowed to run a budget deficit (i.e. take a loan to finance budget). European Union 
has the highest credit rating by all three major rating agencies and in case of default the 
repayment of loans issued is backed by the EU budget. Primarily all the loans issued 
through these facilities are designed as a medium-term aid. Maturity can differ from 3 
years up to 15 years for the longest maturity. All the loan arrangements regarding maturity, 
interest and total amount are decided jointly by the Commission and the Council, and 
finally negotiated with the beneficiary country. Furthermore, all loans are denominated 
solely in euro currency. In the similar fashion like IMF, installments are conditioned by 
achievement of various conditions negotiated jointly with the loan. (European Commission 
2011c) 
 
2.2.1 Balance-of-Payments assistance 
 
Balance-of-Payments assistance (BoP) is a program for non-Eurozone countries. Under 
the Article 143 of the Lisbon Treaty, EU can offer loan to a country suffering from severe 
problems related to its balance of payments. Even though EU can lend affected countries 
on its own, it often cooperates with other institutions, for example IMF. Prior to any 
negotiation of the loan, beneficiary state has to offer an adjustment plan. If the plan is 
found viable, Commission and other lenders will decide on financial conditions. Specific 
steps of the adjustment program are summarized in Memorandum of Understanding. 
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Following targets set in Memorandum is obligatory and a prerequisite to obtaining regular 
installments of the financial aid. If the economic situation changes significantly, those 
conditions can be renegotiated and readjusted in order to reflect a new situation. 
In reaction to recent financial crisis, aggregated lending limits of this facility had to be 
increased from initial amount of EUR 12 billion, to 25 billion in December 2008 and, as it 
have proven to be insufficient, up to 50 billion in May 2009. Unlike IMF loans, under BoP 
assistance program EU doesn't charge any extra margin to troubled countries, so the 
same interest charged for a loan to EU is charged to the recipient.  
In the following table is an overview of Member States drawing funds from Balance-of-
Payments program. (European Commission 2011b) 
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Status of the programme  
(as of June 2010) 
Main areas of policy 
conditionality 
Hungary 
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case by case basis 
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Fiscal consolidation 
Fiscal governance reform 
Financial sector regulation 
and supervision reform 
Other structural reforms 
(mainly related to transport 
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Latvia 






continue), although part 
of bilateral funding will be 
treated as credit lines 
Fiscal consolidation 
Fiscal governance reform 
Financial sector regulation 
and supervision reform 
Structural reforms, 
business environment 











Fiscal governance reform 
Reform of public wage 
system 
Pension reform 
Financial sector regulation 
and supervision reform 
Absorption of EU funds 
Source: European Commision (2011b), [Accesed 3.6. 2011] 
 
From the above table is apparent, that the policy conditionality is very similar to the ones 
included in Eurozone Members' bailouts, even though the amount of necessary funding is 
about four or five times lower. Crucial role plays fiscal consolidation, fiscal governance 
reform, and improvements in a financial sector regulation and supervision. Moreover as in 
many new Member States it is important to reform pension system and undergo structural 
reforms. It must be noted, that non-Eurozone countries asked for financial assistance 
much earlier, prior to the start of debt crisis. 
Council agreed on balance of payments loan for Hungary in November 2008. Hungary 
received total amount of EUR 5,5 bn in three installments, so it didn't use the whole limit of 
EUR 6,5 bn. The rest of the 20bn aid Hungary received from IMF (12,5bn) and the World 
Bank (1bn). Nowadays Hungary undergoes post-program monitoring and surveillance by 
IMF and European Commission. 
Balance-of-payments loan for Latvia was agreed in December 2008. Total amount of EUR 
3,1 bn provided by EU was split in 6 tranches. So far, Latvia has received first four of them 
and remaining two should be paid out in 2011. The remaining amount of EUR 4,4 bn was 
provided by multiple countries and institutions, including IMF and World Bank. Latvia 
should start repaying the loan in 2014. 
Financial assistance for Romania was agreed in May 2009. Out of 5 installments by EU, 
four have been paid out and the remaining one should be paid in 2011. The remaining 
amount was paid by multiple institutions. The largest part comes from IMF. Loan should 
start being paid back in 2015.  




2.2.2 Macro-Financial Assistance 
 
Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) is an instrument designated only to non-Member 
countries. It operates with medium and long run scope. Macro-Financial Assistance is a 
complementary facility designed to help other EU or IMF programs. It can have a form of a 
loan or even of a contribution. Unlike most other financial aids, the whole amount of 
financial assistance is transferred to recipient's central bank. Also another feature, which 
makes it different, is the fact that it is mostly up to the recipient how it spends the money. 
MFA is primarily designed as a help with short term balance-of-payments deficits and/or to 
support structural reforms. It is based on ad-hoc nature decided case-by-case.  
As in other cases, recipient country needs to agree on a set of conditions stated in 
Memorandum of Understanding. Nowadays (July 2011) the total financial exposition of 
MFA facility is approximately  € 497 million. As can be noted in graphs bellow, MFA facility 
was most active in years following the breakup of the Soviet block. European Union was 
helping with the process of economic transformation and after about a decade the activity 
of MFA declined. In the second graph can be noted that over the years Central and 
Eastern European countries has received most (52%) of MFA funds. As the 
macroeconomic conditions in Central and Eastern European region improved, MFA shifted 
its support towards Mediterranean and Western Balkans countries. Since 2001, those 
regions has received about 66% of the whole MFA support. Most of the remaining part 
was received by new independent states, which have problems with funding. In future the 
ad-hoc nature of the program should be replaced by a formal framework. Regular support, 
especially for prospective EU members, is provided by another designated fund, for 













Figure 4: MFA activity 
 
  
   
Source: European Commission (2011a), [Accessed on 15.7.2011] 
 
2.3. New EU Financial Instruments 
 
After the occurrence of Greek crisis, it became clear that European Union has to step in 
and bailout all troubled Eurozone Members, in order to stop the contagion from spreading  
and protect the existence of the Eurozone itself. Neither the Eurozone, nor the European 
Union were prepared for such situation, because they felt protected by the Stability and 
Growth Pact. There were no institutions or facilities capable of provision of financial 





Certainly there is always the IMF designed for such occasions, so naturally there were 
many question asking why is the EU creating new institutions if it can use services of IMF. 
Financing requirements of the Eurozone exceeded the capacity of the Fund. Moreover the 
profit of IMF is dispersed all over the world, whereas a profit of the similar European fund 
would stay in the EU. 
European Union is willing to protect its Single market and the Eurozone project virtually at 
all costs. European integration has a rich history and the possible failure of Eurozone 




European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) is a brand new institution providing 
financial assistance by EU in position of a borrower. It was established in May 2010 as a 
reaction on Greek crisis and deteriorating state of banking sector and sustainability of 
public finances across Europe. Quite surprisingly, before the outbreak of the European 
Debt crisis there was no institution designed for a financial help to Euro Area Member 
States. Even though it is primarily a substitute for the Balance-of-Payments Assistance 
program, which is designated to non-Eurozone Members only, EFSM is open for all EU 
Member States in distress. Similarly to BoP assistance, European Commission borrow 
money through a bond issue in the capital market or take a loan from a financial institution. 
Financial assistance can also take a form of a credit line, but it has not been used so far. 
The loan is then transferred to the recipient Member state. Even though the whole loan is 
passed down, the default risk is borne by European Union, as the loan is backed by EU 
budget, despite it has no collateral. The existence of EFSM is based on and justified by the 
Article 125(2) of Treaty of Lisbon. That is rather controversial as the Article 125 was 
intended as a “no-bailout clause”.  
Member state applying for funding from EFSM has to provide an assessment of its 
financial needs and a macroeconomic and adjustment program. European Commission 
together with ECB decides on set of conditions and terms of financial assistance including 
the target amount, interest, number and frequency of installments. As with other EU loans, 
those conditions are summarized in Memorandum of Understanding and its fulfillment is 
reviewed on a regular basis (at least semi-annually) by an EC and ECB committee. 
Release of every installment depends on findings of the committee. 
As the existence of EFSM is based on presence of serious threats or financial 
 
 21 
disturbances beyond control of Member States, the Commission has to decide every six 
month if those conditions for existence of EFSM program are still viable. Last review was 
made in November 2010 and it was concluded, that EFSM program should continue, 
because there are still present severe threats beyond control of Member States. Sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe continues and it is still many years from being tamed and solved. 
So far the program has been activated for Ireland and Portugal. The reason why Greece is 
not using this facility is quite simply because EFSM didn't exist by the time a rescue plan 
for Greece was negotiated. In fact Greek Crisis was a trigger event for creation of safety 
net to bailout troubled EU countries. Until then there was a negligible political will to solve 
the problem of a long-term sustainability of public finances in Europe.  
 









2/1/2011 Ireland €5 bn €5 bn 2,5% 12/4/2015 Annual 
3/17/2011 Ireland & 
Romania 
€4,6 bn €3,4 bn  
€1,2 bn 
3,25% 4/4/2018 Annual 
3/24/2011 Ireland & 
Portugal 
€4,75 bn €3 bn  
€1,75 bn 
3,5% 6/4/2021 Annual 
6/1/2011 Portugal €4,75 bn €4,75 bn 2,75% 6/3/2016 Annual 
 
Source: European Commission (2011f) 
 
Until May 2011, four bonds were issued to finance EFSM program and EFSM gained total 
of €17,9 bn for Ireland and Portugal. There was a high demand for all issues and books 
were oversubscribed. The highest demand came from investors in Germany, France, UK, 









Face to face with the sovereign debt crisis in European Union, it became apparent that 
some of Eurozone members will need to use emergency lending facility to stop the 
imminent threat of bankruptcy. There were many political disputes whether EU needs its 
own body that would just double one of the core functions of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Unfortunately, amount of funding required by affected Eurozone countries greatly 
exceeded capacities of the IMF. On May 9th 2010, it was decided by EU's Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) that will be created Economic and Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF). This facility is meant to be solely a transitional body. It was founded in 
June 7th 2010 and should cease to exist in June 2013. In case there will any unpaid loan 
provided by EFSF by June 2013, the tenure will be prolonged until the maturity of the debt 
instrument or its full repayment. The structure of EFSF is a joint-stock company based in 
Luxemburg. All Eurozone members are equal stock holders. Due to the shared nature of 
risk, EFSF fund was given the highest possible rating (AAA / Aaa) by all major rating 
companies – Moody's, Fitch Ratings, and Standard & Poors. In order to maintain AAA 
rating, guarantees will be 120% of total value of loans, because only 6 Eurozone Members 
have the highest rating (Fitch). Repayment of any bond issued by EFSF is granted by all 
member states. EFSF doesn't have any collateral, but as collateral are used Member 
States’ shares in the capital of ECB. The very first issue was a major success. The amount 
of € 5 billion in 5 years bonds was sold just in 17 minutes and the demand from investors 
was almost nine fold higher than then the book value of the first issue. The main reason for 
such demand is the prime rating of those bonds issued by EFSF. Moreover, they had 
about 40bp risk premium compared to benchmark Bundesbonds with the same rating. 
EFSF targets the amount of €16,5 billions of funds to raise this year (2011) and another 
€10 billion in 2012. (EFSF 2010) Despite the emission being a great success, it raises 
concerns about future demand of investors for sovereign bonds, because Eurobonds 
issued by EFSF have a good premium whilst bearing a negligible risk and prime rating. In 
theory the fund in cooperation with IMF and EU (European Commission) could provide 







Table 5: Capacity of the safety net 
€ 750 bn 
 
Total amount 
€ 60 bn EU (EFSM) 
€ 560 bn 
 
Loanable 
€ 250 bn IMF 
€ 440 bn EFSF 
Source: Author 
The problem was that in order to keep the highest rating, EFSF has to keep large 
reserves, so the total amount € 750 billions of loanable funds was significantly reduced. 
EFSF had only about €250 bn of effective capacity. Because of that, there were pressures 
to increase the capital ceiling of the fund and in June 2011 the capital of EFSF has been 
increased to make the effective lending capacity € 440 bn instead of € 250 bn. In near 
future the fund will have to provide a further emergency funding to highly indebted Greece, 
which is nowadays financed through other means. It seems that the worst case scenario is 
going to happen and Italy or Spain will have to seek a bailout. ECB nowadays persuades 
EU politicians to increase capacity of the safety net up to € 1,5 trillion to make the bailout 
of Italy or Spain possible. Also there is a possibility that EFSF might start buying Greek 
sovereign bonds to help Greece rollover its huge debt. (EFSF 2001) 
The very first and certainly not the last country, which used the emergency funding from 
EFSF was Ireland. Without EFSF, Ireland would have to borrow money to facilitate debts 
at a staggering rate of more than 9% p.a. for 10-year bonds. Investors were afraid of the 
state of Irish banking sector and economy, so that the risk premium rose to unsustainable 
levels. Without the help from EFSF during several months, Ireland would have been forced 
to declare a bankruptcy. Ireland was given a loan of € 85 billion. From this amount EFSF 
share is only € 17,7 billions. The rest composes of € 22,5 billion from IMF, the same 
amount from EU reserve fund, € 4,8 billion from United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark. 
Remaining € 17,5 billions is covered by Irish pension fund and Treasury reserves. There is 
major disapproval in Ireland regarding the height of interest it has to pay for the loan 
(5,83%), which is much higher than 2,75% EFSF pays for the loan. Apart from the risk 
premium, the purpose of such a high interest is also motivational. In case the cost of 
borrowing for EFSF remains lower than the cost of lending, the profit will be equally 
distributed among all Eurozone members. In 2011 the second country using EFSF 
emergency funding became Portugal. Total value of Portuguese bail-out package is € 78 
bn distributed evenly between EFSF, EFSM and IMF.  
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   Maturity Amortization 
6/29/2011 Portugal €3 bn €2.2 bn 5.32% 12/5/2016 bullet 
6/22/2011 Portugal €5 bn €3.7 bn 6.08% 7/5/2021 bullet 
1/2/2011 Ireland €5 bn €3.6 bn 5.90% 7/18/2016 bullet 
 
Source: EFSF (2011) 
 
The reason why the disbursed amount is lower than the total value of issue is because 
EFSF needs to keep certain cash reserves to maintain the highest rating of the fund and 
consequently all bond issues. 
In 2013 EFSF should be superseded by the European Stability Mechanism. Opposed to 
EFSF’s ad hoc nature, the superseding body is meant to be a proper institution to cope 
with excessive government debts and other financial problems that might occur in the 
Eurozone.  
 
2.3.3 ESM  
 
Both EFSF and EFSM facilities are just of a temporary nature and will be replaced with a 
proper institution. They were created only as special-purpose-vehicles to cover the period 
until European politicians negotiate all particular details and a functioning of a successor 
institution. After June 2013, both EFSF and EFSM will be merged under the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). EFSF will continue to exist even after June 2013 until all 
outstanding debt is repaid. Combined lending capacity of EFSF and ESM shouldn't exceed 
€500B. After June 2013, all proceedings from debt issued by EFSM will be transferred to 
ESM. 
ESM will be located in Luxemburg and its financial assistance will be available only to 
Eurozone members. Functioning of ESM will be based mainly on EFSF facility, but it will 
have several unique features compared to EFSF. Member States can apply for emergency 
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funding if they are facing severe financing problems and stability of the whole Eurozone is 
threatened. Similarly to EFSF, any funding provided by ESM will be subject to strict 
conditionality. Decision on providing financial assistance will be subject to unanimity of 
Eurogroup Ministers and it will be based on an assessment of Member’s debt sustainability 
by the Commission, IMF, and ECB. Assistance will be always followed and conditioned by 
stringent austerity measures and the fiscal sustainability will be monitored. If the country is 
deemed insolvent it should attempt to negotiate debt restructuring with private creditors 
according to IMF standards. If it succeeds and the country is found solvent again, it would 
be eligible for liquidity assistance from ESM. (Siert 2010) 
Eurozone’s Ministers of Finance creates a Board of Governors. President of the ECB and 
European Commisioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs will participate in meetings as 
observers. Part of all decisions will be made by a qualified majority, the rest will be 
decided by a mutual consent. Unanimous decision will be needed for an agreement on 
financial assistance including its terms and conditions, changes on total landing capacity, 
and use of financial instruments. Qualified majority voting will be used for less important 
decisions. By qualified majority is meant at least 80% of all votes. To respect different 
capital subscriptions to ESM, each voting member will be assigned proportionate voting 
right. Next to Board of Governors, ESM will have also a Board of Directors, one for each 
member state. Decisions made by Board of Directors will be made according to qualified 
majority voting. Board of Governors will appoint several Managing Directors that will be 
operating under Board of Directors. 
On March 24th 2011 it was decided that the European Stability Mechanism will have a total 
capital of € 700bn. In order to maintain the highest rating, only € 500bn will be effectively 
loanable. Effective capital will be a mix of paid-in capital, callable capital and guarantees. 
Paid-in capital will consist of € 80bn paid in 5 annual installments starting on June 2013. 
Those installments might be accelerated if it would be necessary to keep 15% ratio of 
loans to paid-in capital. Prior to activation of ESM, profit from investment of a paid-in 
capital will be distributed among Members after all operating costs are paid. After the 
activation of ESM, proceedings from investments will be kept in ESM. Board of Directors 
can decide on paying of dividend. After June 2013, all proceedings from sanctions given 
by violating Stability and Growth Pact or Macroeconomic Imbalance procedures will be 
paid to ESM and increase the paid-in capital. Member States will pay a proportional share 
of capital according to a modified ECB key shown in Appendix 5. 
ESM will be closely cooperating with IMF in offering the assistance. IMF will be necessary 
to assist with its expertise and financial resources. Compliance with conditions of 
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macroeconomic adjustment program will be monitored by the Commission, ECB and IMF 
on regular basis it will be reported to the Council and Board of Directors. Board of 
Directors will decide by mutual agreement if it releases another part of the loan. The 
Council might decide after a discussion with Board of Directors, that it will monitor the 
member state until the loan is fully repaid.  
ESM offers the stability support, which is either a short-term or medium term support to 
renew macroeconomic stability of euro-area member state experiencing severe financial 
difficulties. Length of the help and other conditions are subject to the state of problems the 
country is experiencing. It is designed to help countries until they regain access to financial 
markets.  
ESM can also provide primary market support facility as a part of financial assistance. 
Under certain conditions given by terms of financial assistance, ESM might intervene on 
the primary sovereign bond market to support further effects of the loan. It is subject of 
mutual agreement in the Board of Governors. 
Pricing will be decided by Board of Governors, but the interest should be lower than the 
current interest required for EFSF loans. ESM can lend both on fixed or variable interest 
rate. Pricing should follow IMF guidelines and while being above funding costs of ESM and 
bearing an adequate risk premium. Pricing should be calculated as follows: ESM operating 
costs + 200 basis points. If the maturity exceeds 3 years the pricing will be increased by 
another 100 basis points p.a. And the final interest rate will be calculated as a weighted 
average. 
After the assessment of debt sustainability and possibility of threatening Eurozone's 
stability, involvement of private investors in the bailout will considered. If the country is 
considered solvent after it undergoes the macroeconomic stabilization program, private 
investors will be advised to hold their position. If the country determined is no longer 
solvent, government will have to negotiate adequate commitment and cooperation from 
private investors. This agreement with investors will have to precede obtaining of the 
financial assistance. Negotiation with creditors should bear IMF principles. The 
involvement of private investors should be proportional to the extent of country's 
insolvency. Government should keep investors informed and negotiations should be open. 
On the other hand, under fairness an option to decrease the net present value of the debt 
should be kept as last resort. Because of the potential spillover effect and a risk of 
contagion, effects on other countries will be considered during the negotiations with private 
sector. 
After July 2013, all euro bonds with maturity over 1 year will have an identical standardized 
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collective action clause (CAC), aggregation, and disenfranchisement clauses. CACs 
should be consistent with US and UK law. These clauses are designed to help in the 
process of negotiation between creditors and debtors in case of a default. Such clause 
allows bondholders to negotiate debt restructuring under qualified majority voting and 
thanks to aggregation clause, all debt securities will be negotiated together. All decisions 
made under qualified majority are binding for all bondholders under CAC. 
Disenfranchisement clause is there to protect voting rights of bondholders.  
Compared to EFSF, ESM has another feature, which started a heated discussion over its 
justification. Similarly to IMF, debt issued by ESM will have a preferred creditor status over 
all other loans, except for loans provided by the IMF. Claims of private investors will be 
subordinated under the European Stability Mechanism, even those bearing a senior 
status. This feature of ESM might backfire quite badly, because investors in the senior 
bonds will require a higher risk premium, to compensate for subordination. Also during a 
future sovereign debt crisis, investors will preface investing in ESM eurobonds, because 
they have a decent premium and a pooled risk. In the future, the yield differential on 
sovereign bonds of a troubled Member State might rise at a much higher rate, when 
investors start to anticipate activation of ESM support. 
Another discussed problem is a clause, which allows Board of Directors to automatically 
increase capital of the fund, which was strongly opposed by Germany, which will be the 
main contributor to the fund. 




As was mentioned earlier the whole process of the Eurozone bailout is a to some extent 
distorted by the political bias. Even though IMF only contributes to the bailout, during the 
sovereign debt crisis it became overly exposed to the European Union. For example 
exposition of the IMF to Greece exceeds 1234% of Greek quota. (IMF, 2011) Possible 
explanation might be Strauss-Kahn’s candidacy for a French president as he might to be 
tempted to protect French investments in Greece. 
Bailout itself is a rather controversial as it is not in accordance with Treaty, which 
specifically contains a “no-bailout clause” – Article 125.1.  
 
“The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
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regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the 
joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without 
prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.” 
(Treaty) 
 
The bailout is being justified by the Article 122.2, which allows a financial assistance under 
certain extreme conditions. 
 
“Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on 
a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial 
assistance to the Member State concerned. The President of the Council shall inform the 
European Parliament of the decision taken.”  (Treaty 2010) 
 
Existence of the permanent bailout fund should be properly justified by a proposed 
amendment to the Article 136 of the Treaty. 
  
"The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to 
strict conditionality".  (Euro Parliament 7.3.2011) 
 
Even though the legal grounds behind creation of the financial fund or the bailout itself are 
at least questionable, it was absolutely essential that the fund was created, because 
offering a financial assistance through multiple bilateral loans is rather cumbersome and 
choices of financing would be quite limited. Thanks to the extraordinary high risk of 





2.4.1 Political bias 
 
Development of the European sovereign debt crisis indicates that bailouts are to some 
extent politically biased. President of each of the European institutions involved in bailouts 
is subject to a conflict of interests. Arising principal-agent problem is more than obvious 
and it might influence finding of a permanent solution protecting the Eurozone in the future. 
 
Table 7: Conflict of interests 
 







José Manuel Barroso Portuguese 
European 
Commission 
Herman Von Rompuy Belgian 
ECB 
Jean-Claude Trichet French 
Mario Draghi Italian 
 
 
There is also a controversy of the role of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the 
French President Nicholas Sarcozy during the EU negotiations. There is no doubt that the 
biggest creditors of sovereign bailouts should have a superior authority over the rest of 
Eurozone Members. On the other hand, the power of the French-German coalition is a 
little extreme and unfair to the rest of Members. They even had the impertinence to pre-
negotiate some acts and present them to others like a closed case. For example this way 
they prepared the Pact for Competitiveness and argued to pass the tax harmonization 
clause as mandatory, even though it was primarily targeted against Ireland. Irish Prime 
Minister refused to sign the tax clause deeming it is non-negotiable, and in return France 
and Germany blocked the possibility of interest rate cut on the bailout loan.  
European Union and the whole integration is a political project, but it can’t work if 
everything would be decided by two biggest nations and the rest of Members will be on the 
meetings just to fill empty seats. 
Also it might be a little hard to understand a devotion of the IMF to European bailouts, 
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because all of recipient countries have exceeded their quota in the fund and the exposition 
of IMF towards Europe reached over 50%, which raises concerns about its bias. It all fits in 
the frame of principal-agent problem as we realize that the former President of IMF, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn was a French presidential candidate in the upcoming elections. 
He wouldn’t hesitate for even a minute to do something, which pleases his potential voters. 
Decisions of a former Portuguese Prime Minister about the bailout of Portugal are highly 
questionable. Quite ironical sounds the speech of José Manuel Barroso, who got angry 
over the recent downgrade of Portugal by Moody’s rating agency:  
“The commission is looking into the regulation of rating agencies to determine whether 
there are some measures that need to be taken with regard to the prevention of possible 
conflicts of interest and other matters.” (Stearns 2011) 
If the handling of the sovereign debt crisis is biased, it can be expected that the final 





















Ireland managed to develop from seriously a under performing economy to a growth 
miracle in the 90’s. Until the end of 1980’s, Irish per capita GDP was the second lowest in 
non-communistic Europe. Yet since the start of 90’s Ireland managed to perform a 
sustainable growth over 7% comparable to Asian Tigers and soon became one of the top 
European economies. Ireland had for the last decade extraordinary public finances and 
one of the lowest debts in Europe. Unfortunately none of this managed to protect Ireland 
from impacts of its banking crisis and in just two years time the economic miracle was 
ruined and Ireland faced a serious threat of sovereign default. 
3.1 History of Ireland 
 
The history of the Republic of Ireland is quite remarkable. Before the creation of republic, 
Ireland was a part of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Unlike Britain, the 
position of Ireland within the Kingdom was rather inferior. Even though the Great Britain 
thrived during the Industrial Revolution and Victorian era, by that time in Ireland was 
struggling with poverty related to major underdevelopment. In the period of 1840's, there 
was a major outbreak of famine caused by the unprecedented spread of potato blight, 
which decimated Irish crops. Potatoes were the main component of a diet for almost one 
third of population and United Kingdom decided not to help them as a punishment for 
separatist tendencies. Ironically, during the famine, Irish farmers had a lot of sheep, cattle 
and crops, but they had to all give it to British landlords as a payment for land. As a result, 
almost one fourth of population died or emigrated, mostly to the United States and the 
United Kingdom. In total between 1845 and 1925 population in Ireland decreased by 65% - 
from 8,5 million to only 3 million. (Historical Statistics) Nowadays, despite the highest 
natality rate in Europe, population of Ireland has reached only 4,5 million. 
After famines Ireland got better quite soon and the output per capita was just slightly below 
the European average. During the First World War Ireland economy got better as a result 
of growing food price in Great Britain, since high percentage (most) of the Irish export 
production was agricultural. Declaration of the independence and creation of Free Irish 
State in 1922 was preceded by two consequent wars – Anglo-Irish War and the Civil War. 
Unlike other European countries, by the time of declaration most farmers were already 
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landowners and the republic inherited good banking and educational systems and decent 
infrastructure (Sweeney 1999). Majority of Irish exports was dependent on British demand. 
In order to help domestic economy, Ireland attempted to take advantage of Britain. Since 
1932, under de Valera administration, previous laissez-faire policy was abandoned and 
there was imposed a high level of protectionism, which lasted until the end of 1950's. 
British retaliation was imminent and after several years the tariff war ended by a settlement 
“coal for beef” and Britain returned to Ireland three “Treaty ports”. During the Second 
World War Ireland decided to remain neutral. The main rationale behind it was a public 
opinion after two Irish wars and simply a lack of resources to enter the war. After the war, 
Ireland was one the founders of OEEC (OECD) and also participated in the Marshall Plan. 
Mainly the long-term protectionism accounted for Ireland missing the post-war economic 
boom in Europe. Both OEEC and United States exerted pressure upon Ireland to make it 
retire the protectionism and comply with the post-war free trade development in Europe.  
In 1948 the Republic of Ireland was enacted by the Republic of Ireland Act, so Ireland was 
no longer a British dominion. As a result, Ireland formally left Commonwealth and never 
rejoined. Because of the aforementioned protectionism, the post war economic growth was 
sluggish. Main problems were ineffective agriculture and continuing sky-high emigration. 
More than 400 thousand people emigrated from Ireland during the decade of 1950's. If we 
consider that the total size of population of Ireland was merely 3 million people, the ratio of 
emigrants is shocking for a modern-day European country. (Sweeney 1999)  
In order to give boost to the weak economy and stop the emigration, government decided 
to carry out an indicative four-year plan for economic expansion by the end of 1950's. 
Mainly it composed of tax incentives for foreign investors and gradual decrease in tariffs 
and quotas. Industrial Development Agency (IDA), founded by Irish government in 1949, 
played an important role in attracting foreign investors. In the year 1957 Ireland joined IMF 
and World Bank. The most notable step in the process of opening economy was the 
Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement signed in 1965. After more than twenty years of fierce 
protectionism, Irish industry was lacking behind the world in terms of quality of products 
and productivity. (O’Hearn 1998) As a result of introduction of free trade, Irish 
entrepreneurs were hit quite hard in following years. On the one hand, consumers 
benefited from cheaper goods, but on the other hand unemployment rose sharply in the 
meantime. Along with the free trade, there were large subsidies for farmers and in 
following decade exports rose rapidly.  
In the year 1961 Ireland, Britain, Norway and Denmark applied for a membership in 
European Economic Community (EEC), but the accession was vetoed by French president 
 
 33 
Charles de Gaulle, who perceived Britain as a potential threat. All member candidates had 
to wait for almost twelve years until the next EEC enlargement took place. De Gaulle's 
successor, president Charles Pompidou lifted the veto, and in 1973 Ireland finally became 
an EEC member. The decade of 1960's was the heyday of Irish economy surpassed only 
in the era of Celtic tiger. Ireland was successful in attracting foreign investors by tax 
incentives and opening the economy. On the whole, the growth of Irish GDP per capita 
until mid 70's was slightly below European average. But then the growth in 70's was above 
the average in the rest of Europe, because the first oil shock did not affect Ireland as much 
as other countries. Ireland was hit hard by the second oil shock and was badly affected in 
terms of high inflation and unemployment. Unlike most countries, Irish economy kept on 
growing. However, this was solely a result of massive public spending initiated by Fianna 
Fáil, which came to power in 1977. In Ireland was Keynesian approach rather successful 
and thus popular, but it wasn't recognized by the government, that it is not an universal 
solution. As it was financed mostly through debt, Ireland became rapidly heavily indebted 
and it took a long time to reinstate Irish public finance. 
  
Figure 5: Irish debt 
 
Source: IMF annual data, (% of GDP). 
 
The Keynesian expansion worked quite well and helped the Irish economy to get over the 
crisis. Unfortunately, following governments were not willing to make unpopular budget 
cuts and the debt burden rose to unprecedented levels. Before the massive spending, 
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public finance of Ireland could be presented as exemplar among European countries. They 
had a low foreign debt combined with negligible budget deficits. After the untamed fiscal 
expansion Ireland rapidly became the most indebted European country. In 1987 the debt-
to-GDP ratio reached shocking 109% compared to just 53% in 1973. Debt service in 1986 
was almost 95% of all indirect tax revenues. (O’Hearn 1998) It called for an imminent 
action and fortunately the deficit of following year's budget was cut below 2%. Luckily for 
Ireland, from 1987 on, all budgets had a low deficit and also the central bank managed to 
keep the inflation low.  
Until 1979 Irish pound was pegged to sterling. After the turbulent 70's, which caused high 
inflation in the United Kingdom, Ireland decided to leave the peg and entered the 
supposedly safer European Monetary System (EMS). Despite the later crises of EMS, 
Ireland remained in the system and consequently became the Eurozone member. Thanks 
to tight budgets Ireland manage to sanitize its public finance and had no problems with 
passing Maastricht criteria. 
   
3.2 Celtic Tiger 
 
In response to a staggering emigration and relatively poor performance of Irish economy, 
politicians started to call for major changes of the economic model in order to stabilize and 
improve the current state of public finance and the whole economy. Ireland suffered from 
low productivity both in agriculture and industry, which was mostly accounted to 
underdevelopment. High level of tariff barriers protected Ireland from foreign competition 
and thus helped domestic producers, but it also repelled foreign investors and worsened 
market competition and product quality.  
The most important period of the transformation of Irish economy started in late 1950's. 
During decades, Ireland gradually changed from predominantly agricultural producer to an 
industrialized country. Until 1972, agricultural products namely beef, wool and cotton 
created the majority of Irish exports. At that time, agriculture was dwarfed by industry in 
most of developed European countries. Opening of the economy combined with various 
incentives lured many foreign investors and the number of transnational companies was 
quickly growing. The most important wave of transnational companies were American 
investors, which came to Ireland after 1973, when Ireland became a member of the 
European Economic Community. Due to various tax incentives and especially tax breaks 
and low 12,5% corporate tax, Ireland became a tax heaven for foreign investors. There 
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were other powerful benefits of setting up Irish subsidiary. The most significant were free 
imports of intermediate goods under the incentives program and re-export of their final 
products into the European Single Market. Moreover, the extent of governmental 
regulation was very low in Ireland.  
Ireland was lucky, that it managed to attract a number of American computer and 
pharmaceutical companies, which belongs to the most profitable and leading industrial 
sectors nowadays. Irish government invested heavily in order to attract foreign investors. It 
was hoped that transnational companies would develop a supply chains for intermediaries 
among domestic companies in Ireland. On the other hand, transnational companies 
crowded out majority of domestic producers. According to estimates, about 44% of Irish 
companies bankrupted as a result of opening economy. (O'Hearn 1998) Transnational 
companies didn't use as much labor intensive processes as domestic firms, they have 
replaced, which resulted in one of the highest unemployment in Europe at that time 
reaching 17,3% in 1985. Government supported emigration, which served as a tool to 
solve the unemployment problem. Almost half million people emigrated in the decade of 
mid-80's to mid 90's.  
Unfortunately, as those foreign investors could freely import all the intermediaries, buying 
of Irish goods appeared to be less profitable for them. The rate of reinvestment was very 
low and if those transnational companies spent some money in Ireland, it was mainly for 
basic services and goods. Minimum percentage of their profits were used for capital 
investment. The capital investment appeared only with the initial investment, when those 
companies came to Ireland. Most of their profits were repatriated and, as a result, the 
effect of foreign investors on domestic economy, notably domestic industry, was smaller 
than expected. Government invested a lot of money to attract investors, but the 
multiplication effect of foreign investment on domestic economy was far lower than was 
hoped for. More than half of profits of transnational companies was repatriated between 
1980's and mid-1990's, in terms of GDP it was as much as 12%. (Sweeney 1999)  
The problem with repatriation of profits started to be actively solved in 1985, when Irisih 
Development Agency employed “National Linkages Programme”. It was targeted mainly 
on American subsidiaries and the main aim was to “link” those subsidiaries with domestic 
suppliers during following 5 years. Despite the low percentage of Irish materials bought by 
TNC's they used local services almost as much as domestic firms, which led to the growth 





Figure 6: Irish economic growth 
 
Source: IMF, (%, constant prices). 
 
Since the beginning of 1990's, Ireland witnessed an era of spurred economic growth. This 
was a true miracle, if we take into account problems of Ireland with an immense external 
debt and not so convincing performance of the economy in 70's and 80's. Until then was 
such a growth observed only in several Asian emerging economies – Asian tigers. Yet 
Ireland manages to attain annual real GDP growth of more than 8% for almost a decade. 
For the rapid economic growth was Ireland nicknamed the Celtic Tiger. It was first used in 
a report by American investment bank Morgan Stanley, but it fast became popular and it 
was a pregnant description of the Irish economy. The high tempo of GDP growth 
surpassed the EU average as early as in 1980's. Whereas the economic growth in 80's 
was caused to large extent by fiscal expansion (see the figure above), the growth since the 
late 80's was rather different. The nature of the economic boom and rise of the new Tiger 
could be described in one word – America. United States was the source of almost 80% of 
all foreign direct investments in Ireland. There are many reasons why United States 
invested so intensively in Ireland. Ireland is closer to America than other European 
countries. As it is a EU Member, there are another benefits in form of access to single 
European market and Ireland is a good entry point for further expansion into Europe. Other 
reasons were skilled and well educated labor force and relatively low wages by that time. 
The other important factors were common language, low governmental regulation and 
significant tax incentives. For all those aforementioned reasons, the boom in United States 
was a major pull factor and cause for Irish economic miracle in 90's. For the first time in 
decades, there was a net immigration to Ireland, compared to over 200 thousand Irish 
citizens emigrating in 80's. Long-term high unemployment reaching 17% percent in 1986 
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plummeted way below the EU average. Before the boom, Ireland was lacking behind the 
rest of Europe both in GDP per capita and standards of living.  
 
Figure 7: Irish GDP per capita as a percent of EU average 
 
Source: IMF, (PPP adjusted; 2011 and 2012 figures are IMF estimates). 
 
As there are many positive social and economic effects of unprecedented economic 
growth it brought about also some problems. Because the growth brought about the 
demand for labor, wages rocketed up nationwide. As common people got wealthier, 
obviously also the consumption rose rapidly, inflation increased and there was an 
increased demand on the real-estate market. The economic growth of several leading 
industries spilled over to housing market and there was a massive increase in construction 
industry. Excessive demand was responsible for creating a housing bubble. It had several 
positive impacts too. Increase in housing demand caused higher construction, which 
further decreased unemployment and fostered the growth of GDP. As the economic 
growth was so spurred it necessarily resulted in high inflation pushed mainly by real estate 
and rapidly increasing costs of services. Economy was clearly overheated and would have 
been good to slow down the economy a little. Because Ireland is a Eurozone member, it 








Figure 8: Irish Inflation  
 
Source: IMF, (Average consumer prices; 2011 & 2012 figures are IMF estimates). 
 
The era of Tiger was a good example of a positive asymmetric shock. The business cycle 
of Ireland is much more correlated with the American one, rather than European. Irish 
government had tied hands and wasn't able to decrease inflation by means of monetary 
policy. Era of Celtic Tiger lasted only until 2001. United States was hit by recession. The 
slow down started after a burst of the Dotcom bubble and the ill-famous terrorist attacks in 
September 2001. After 2001, Irish economy was growing mainly due to the momentum 
gained in 90's, but the growth was much smaller than it used to be. Growth increased 
again during the economic boom period between 2004-2006. 
 
3.3 Credit Crunch 
 
When the financial crisis came to Europe, Irish banking sector was hit really hard. The 
reason for problems of banks was more or less the same as in the United States – credit 
crunch after a burst of the real-estate bubble. After fall of Lehman Brothers, there was a 
fear of possible bank run and Irish government decided to guarantee for €400 bn of 
obligations in 6 “backbone” banks as a precautionary measure. Guarantees were 
extended in September 2008. The reason for this unfortunate decision was the fact that no 
one by that time imagined the crisis being so deep and losses so high. Recapitalization 
was expected to be only €4bn. Despite some protest, Allied Irish Banks (AIB) was included 
in guarantees, even though it wasn’t perceived as a backbone bank. It was the AIB, who 
had the highest exposition to construction and real estate sectors and couple month it 
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became a huge money pit.  
Before the crisis, Ireland used to have debt-to-GDP lower than Germany and budgetary 
surpluses. Irish public finance was much healthier than in most of the European countries. 
During the crisis, all major Irish banks sustained huge losses and Irish government 
became quickly heavily indebted. (Figure 20) Once a country of the Celtic Tiger soon 
became troubled economy like Greece. Despite the burst of property bubble, Irish banks 
suffered from other problems, especially granting of subprime mortgages like in the US 
and in case of the Anglo Irish even frauds. The most iconic is a hidden loan of € 87 million 
by its chairman Sean FitzPatrick, who managed by accounting tricks to hide the loan from 
shareholders and spend all the money. He managed to transfer all the money on his wife 
and declare personal bankruptcy himself. This is just a tip of the iceberg and vivid 
illustration how Anglo Irish became one of the worst bank in modern history with negative 
20% return on equity in 2010 and € 24 billion net loss. (Barr 2011) 
Benevolent mortgage policy was based on the assumption that Irish economy would 
continue to grow in the similar pace as it did before. Unfortunately granting of subprime 
under-collateralized mortgages was a general lending practice in the whole Irish banking 
sector.  
When the recession hit United States, Irish economy slowed down almost immediately, 
because most of the key companies in Ireland are American owned. Another reason was a 
sudden drop of demand in Europe, because about 80% percent of Irish GDP depends on 
exports and the recession expanded also to Europe. Economic slowdown led to sharp 
increase of unemployment and a lot of people became unable to repay their mortgages.  
 
Table 8: Irish unemployment 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Unemployment   4.6  6.3 11.8 13.6 14.5 
 
Source: IMF, (% of total workforce). 
 
After the bubble burst, the most troubled banks were the Anglo Irish bank and Allied Irish 
Banks. Both of them were over-exposed to developers and housing mortgages. In 2008 
the banking sector looked safe as the overall solvency ratio was 11,98% and the Tier 1 
capital 9,81%. The biggest issues of Irish banking system were the exposition to real-
estate sector and similarly to Iceland size of the banking sector. According to ECB, in 2008 
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were total assets of Irish banking sector reaching €1579 bn, which was almost nine times 
the size of Irish economy by that time. Ireland had over €900 bn in loans and receivables. 
When the Irish credit crunch broke out, Anglo Irish bank had to be nationalized and 
government hoped that capital injection would help the rest of troubled banks. As of March 
2011, the bill for bank rescue program exceeded €46,4 bn and it is still not the final figure. 
In March 2011 it was decided that the banking sector would need to be reduced in size 
and restructured. Anglo Irish bank was merged with Irish Nationwide Building Society. AIB 
was merged with EBS Building Society and recapitalized by €1,5 bn, but it has to 
deleverage by €23 bn until 2013. Bank of Ireland will be recapitalized by €5,2 bn and until 
2013 it will reduce its assets by €30 bn. Irish Life and Permanent was nationalized and its 
insurance division will be sold. Furthermore it will sell €10bn of its non-core assets and will 
be recapitalized by €4 bn. According to Michael Noolan, Irish Minister of Finance, total cost 




3.4 Financial Assistance 
 
Because of generous government guarantees Irish banking crisis turned into the Irish 
sovereign debt crisis and put Ireland into the similar position like other PIIGS countries. 
Banking crisis in Iceland was almost identical, as the size of banking sector was not in 
scale with the economy. The main difference is that the government of Iceland didn’t 
guarantee for bank obligations. Unlike Ireland, Iceland could hope for extensive 
international financial support. Icelandic government tried to save banking sector by 
nationalization, but as the financing requirements sharply rose, it had to default on part of 
banking obligations.  
Thanks to the Irish bank rescue program, and negative outlook of the economy, investors 
were losing confidence and rating agencies cut Irish AAA rating. Risk premium on 








Figure 9: Irish 10-year bond yield 
 
Source: Bloomberg [Accessed 27.7. 2011]. 
 
It was a vicious circle. Every rating downgrade caused yield increase on capital markets, 
and every yield increase pushed Irish government closer to the risk of default, which 
resulted in further downgrades. Banking sector rescue combined with high unemployment 
rate, which makes a huge pressure on social security system, increased budget deficit to a 
record level. By the end of 2010 budget deficit reached 32% and yield on Irish 10 year 
bonds flew over 9%. During the November 2010 Ireland lost access to capital market and 
was forced to ask for a financial assistance by EU and IMF.  
Ireland was given emergency 3-year funding in total amount of €85 bn, with a maximum 
maturity of 7,5 years and average 5,83% interest. Of this amount €67,5 bn was provided 
by EU and IMF, the rest was covered through Irish pension fund reserves. EFSF, EFSM, 
and IMF have equal €22,5 bn share in the bailout package, but the part of EFSF will be 
lessened by bilateral loans of UK, Sweden, and Denmark. (ECOFIN 7.12. 2010)  Similarly 
to Greek bailout, Irish loan was conditioned by strict austerity. Firstly Ireland was required 
to nationalize troubled banks. There was also a pressure on Ireland to increase its 12,5 % 
corporate tax, but Ireland strictly refused to change it, because it is one of the foundation 
stones for Irish economic model. Out of the €85 bn bailout package €35 bn was set for 
bank recapitalization. The remaining part serves to facilitate sovereign debt. 
Austerity measures were included in Irish four-year National Development Plan covering 
period of 2011–2014. Apart from austerity measures it also includes exit strategy to 
support economic growth in following years. Following the bailout Irish Prime Minister 
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Brian Cowen resigned and dismissed the parliament. Opposition criticized bailout package 
for being to strict and the next Prime Minister Enda Kenny promised to negotiate decrease 
of the interest, which was on average 5,83% p.a.. Kenny’s attempts were blocked by 
France and Germany, because Kenny refused to support a tax clause in the Euro Plus 
Pact. (Irish Times 20.4. 2011)  
National Development Plan is designed to save up to € 15 billion over four year period, of 
which 40% should be raised in 2011. Most of the amount (10 billion) should be saved by 
fiscal expenditure cuts. Cuts will be achieved by reduction of employment in public sector 
and limiting social security benefits. Remaining 5 billion should be gained by increased 
taxes and other means. Increased taxes will influence multiple areas except for corporate 
tax, which is sacred for Irish economy and will remain on the same 12,5% level. In 2013 
value added tax (VAT) should increase from 21% to 22% and from 2014 even to 23%. 
Moreover, Ireland will introduce property and water tax. Until now, water in Ireland was for 
free, except for large factories. Furthermore, college tuitions should almost double and 
retirement age should increase from 66 years to 67. Strict austerity measures led to a 
series of massive protests countrywide.  
National Development Plan is meant to stabilize Irish public finance, but there is also 
criticism that it is too strict and might threaten economic recovery. Last, but not least it is 
build around the assumption of 2,75% annual growth till 2014 and decrease of 
employment from current almost 14% below 10%, which turns out to be overly optimistic 
as the real economy contracted by 1% in 2010 and the IMF estimate for this year is 0,5% 














3.5 Outlook of Ireland 
 
Even though the banking and debt crises in Ireland are far from being over, the economic 
outlook looks optimistic. If the United States won’t enter a double dip recession and 
European economic recovery continues, it will improve Irish export economy. Secondly, 
about 20% of GDP is created by three technological giants - Microsoft, Intel and Google, 
and if the corporate tax stay low, there no reason why to move their subsidiaries. (O’Hearn 
1998) Also large share on Irish GDP have pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer, which 
have more stable demand for its products.  
Ireland has one of the highest productivity per worker in Europe, and according to Eurostat 
Ireland managed to decrease ULC by approximately 20% compared since 2008, which will 
further improve Irish competitiveness. According to Eurostat, in 2008 Ireland had the 
second highest per capita GDP from the whole Eurozone, In 2011 Irish GDP is the third 
highest and exceeds even the GDP of Germany. Irish economy seems to be working well 
as in the 2011 Q1 its external balance of goods was the third highest in the Eurozone.  
 
Figure 10: Unemployment in Ireland 
 
Source: CSO Ireland, (2011 – CSO estimate). 
 
The biggest threat of the Irish long-term recovery is the unemployment rate. Emmigration 
is growing fast. It seems like another Irish as was witnessed many times in the past. There 
is threat that the emigration wave will wash out the most perspective generation of young 





Figure 11: Emmigration age 25-44 
 
 
Source: CSO Ireland, (thousands). 
 
The problem of Ireland is rather different than the problems of other PIIGS countries. Irish 
economy was performing extraordinary well, public finances were healthy and 
unemployment low. All of todays Irish troubles stems from the Irish banking crisis. Irish 
banking sector was overgrown as was the Icelandic. Irish Prime Minister Brian Cowen 
made the unfortunate decision in 2008 and guaranteed for banking obligations. Iceland 
was lucky not to make any similar promise. Sovereign debt of Iceland also increased 
during the Icelandic banking crisis, but the increase was much smaller than the one of 
Ireland, because Iceland could default on part of banking obligations. Also unlike Ireland, 
Iceland could devaluate its currency, which helped to increase competitiveness and to 
decrease the debt burden. There is no reason to blame Eurozone for any of the 
contemporary problems of Ireland. Even though the interest rate differential between 
Ireland and the rest of the Eurozone might have helped to blow the property bubble, there 
were many other real-estate bubbles all around the world. In July 2011, the maturity of 









Greece, officially called the Hellenic Republic, used to be a cradle of modern civilization, 
which inspired the rest of Europe and basically the whole world. Nowadays the old glory is 
long gone and the whole world wishes Greeks would accept some wisdom from them. 
Greece became a symbol of European sovereign debt crisis and from now on it will forever 
be a textbook example of how public sector should not have been governed. 
Contemporary situation in Greece is a riddle causing to many political leaders and 
investors countless sleepless nights. Only one thing is clear – there are none but painful 
solutions to this problem. The only question is who and how much should suffer and pay. 
Quite ironically, Greece is one of the smallest European economies, yet it has managed to 
jeopardize further European integration and the existence of the Eurozone itself.  
 




Source: Eurostat, (2010 data). 
4.1 History of Greece 
 
Despite a rich history of the Ancient Greece, the modern history of Greece is much less 
glorious. After the World War I, fought agianst the Ottoman empire, Greece led another 
war with Turkey. After the World War II, Greece suffered again, because of the Civil War 
between left-wing and right-wing supporters between years 1944-1949. After the 35 years  
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period of wars, Greek economy was weak. Despite the war, Greece was a founding 
member of OEEC and participated in the Marshall Plan, which  speeded up the post war 
recovery. Moreover, in 1952 Greece joined NATO. After the elections in 1952, new Greek 
government helped to reinstate economic growth, by reduction of trade barriers and 
significant devaluation of drachma in 1953. After the devaluation, the currency was pegged 
to the American dollar in Bretton Wood system. 
Until the 1963, greek governments had conservative fiscal and monetary policies and 
managed to atract foreign capital and industrialize the country. (Alogoskoufis 1995) In 
1967 came a military cupe and followed over 6 years of government of military junta. Junta 
kept a tight control of economy and especialy unions, but also supported Greek 
companies, by some tarrifs and cheap bank loans. Despite some government 
protectionism, Greece joined the General Agreement on Tarifs and Trades.  
 
Figure 13: Greek growth and inflation 
 
Source: Alogoskoufis (1995), pp.150. 
 
During the period between 1954 - 1973, Greece had a stable annual growth of average 
7,1% followed by a low inflation reaching only 3,8%. (Alogoskoufis 1995) Greek military 
After the breakup of the Bretton Wood system followed a high inflation and the economy of 
Greece was hit especialy hard. Government controled both wages and prices, but wasnt 
able to adjust to such external shock. Junta was tolerated only because if decent 
economic growth, but as Greece entered a deep recession combined with a high inflation, 
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people didn’t tolerate the loss of standard of living and the dictatorship fell in 1974 and 
once again the democratic regime was reinstated. New government increased rapidly 
military expenditures, wages, and the overall size of public sector in an act of populism. 
Role of state was further increased by a controversial nationalization, which caused a 
decrease in foreign investment. Unsustainable fiscal policies led to high deficits and 
problem of primary deficit was compensated by a decrease of infrastructure investments. 
Wages were indexed and the economic suicide continued even though Greece joined the 
EU in 1981. Greece allways suffered from current account deficits, but during the pre-1974 
era it was compensated by a decent economic growth.  
 
Figure 14: Greek curent account deficits 
 
Source: Alogoskoufis (1995), pp.151. 
 
After 1974 Greece entered a long perod of stagflation – negligible growth and 18%. 
Nationalized companies suffered from poor corporat governance and had a low profit. As 
the public finance were getting out of control, in 1985 was drachma devaluated and 
governmen froze wages for two years. After 1989, process of privatization and economic 
liberation was started, but it was slowly implemented. Until today, Greece failed to achieve 




4.2 Greek debt crisis 
 
Greek sovereign debt problem was a trigger event for the European sovereign debt crisis. 
There were several factors why the Greek debt crisis became so grave. The most crucial 
reason was a market panic following uncertainty caused by the Financial Crisis and bad 
state of public finances in Europe. Markets were gravely affected by severe impacts of the 
credit crunch on financial sector and by following economic recession. Panic on markets 
got even worse when it got revealed that Greece has much higher debt than was officially 
stated. After Greek elections in 2009 Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, found 
out that Greece has far higher debts than was declared in official statistics and the budget 
deficit for 2009 will be at least 12,7%. (Baldwin 2010) Previous government hired experts 
from the Goldman Sachs, who advised them how to manipulate debt statistics using 
creative accounting. According to IMF between 1997 and 2007 Greece had an average 
real GDP growth over 4%, but it was mostly driven by budget deficits and fiscal expansion, 
as the biggest growth was related to the Olympic games in Athens in 2004. 
 












Greece had to refinance €54 bn of its sovereign debt in 2010, of which €20 bn was 
maturing by the end of May 2010, but the market panic following questionable Greek 
solvency further increased lending costs well above the sustainable 7% level. Because of 
the market panic there was an extreme risk of contagion to other underperforming and 
heavily indebted Eurozone Members including Spain and Italy. European Commission and 
IMF had to develop an immediate rescue plan in order to buy some time and calm down 
private investors. 
 
4.3 Problems of Greece 
 
There are multiple reasons leading to the current desperate situation of Greece. The first 
and most obvious are problems related to the financial crisis – recession, and market 
panic, but Greece suffer from many longterm economic problems, whose origins dates 
many years back. Greek economy always had serious problems and it was just a matter of 
time till they show up. Financial crisis just speeded up the process.  
It can be argued that benefits of Greek membership in the Eurozone are questionable. 
Unlike the rest of the Eurozone, Greece has just a negligible share of both exports and 
imports on GDP. As a result it is loosing one of the key benefits of membership in the 
common currency area. 
 




Greece 29.4 21 
Eurozone 39.4 40.7 
   
Source: Eurostat; (Goods and services as a % of GDP in 2010). 
 
Apart from questionable benefits of Greek Membership in the Eurozone, There is no 
doubt, that Greece should have never been accepted in the first place. Greek had an 
excessive budget deficit prior to its accession in the Eurozone thus violating Maastricht 
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criteria. For violation of convergence criteria Greece wasn’t allowed to join the newly 
created Eurozone in 1999. Greece finally joined the Eurozone in 2001, but only thanks to 
cheating of statistics. Greece managed to manipulate statistics to artificially decrease 
budget deficit below the 3% limit.  
 
Table 10: Revision of Greek budget deficits and debt 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Unrevised 4 2.5 1.8 2 1.4 1.4 1.7 
Revised 6.6 4.3 3.4 4.1 3.7 3.7 4.6 




1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Unrevised 108 106 105 106 107 105 103 
Revised 114 112 112 114 115 113 110 
Difference 6 6 7 8 8 8 7 
 
Source: IMF (2005), pp.6. 
 
Similarly to other debtors, Greece was allowed having debt above the limit, by claiming it 
would be decreased in future. Accession of Greece was based on manipulated debt and 
deficit statistics, so the Commission came to a wrong conclusion that in 2002 Greece will 
have its debt decreased to 98% of GDP and having a budget surplus of 0,2%. (ECOFIN 
31.1. 2011). Such accounting tricks were not officially admitted until 2004, when Greece 
became subject to excessive deficit procedure. As Wyplosz (2004) notes, Greece wasn’t 
the only country that used some tricks to achieve the deficit limit. France improved budget 
through privatization, Italy collected taxes for the following year and Germany attempted to 
sell its golden reserves, but was stopped by Bundes bank. On the other hand, compared 
to Greece these countries only bended rules to improve figures, but Greece directly 
cheated statistics. 
Apart from cheating, Greece suffer from huge corruption and a large volume of grey 
economy. According to Transparency International (2011) Greece had the 2010 corruption 
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index of 3.5, which is the same level as Albania scoring 3.2 or 3.1 for Mexico. Italy has a 
rather similar problem scoring only a little better at 3.9 out of ten point scale. 
Tax collection is another problem typical both for Greece and Italy. According to estimates, 
Italy fails to collect annual taxes reaching €100 bn (6% of GDP) and Greece €15 bn (6,5% 
of GDP). (The Economist, 12.8. 2010) Greek Ministry of Finance announced in 2011 that it 
will attempt to collect €41 bn of unpaid taxes and fines. (Forbes 8.7. 2011) 
Greece has a persistent problem with its public finance and the only thing, which has 
changed since the Greek accession to the Eurozone is the cost of borrowing. 
Unfortunately, it allowed cheaper refinancing of the sovereign debt and further worsened 
budget deficits as can be seen in the following chart. Budget deficits were decreasing only 
with the prospect of joining the Eurozone. 
 
Figure 16: Greek budget deficits 
 
Source: IMF revised data, (% of GDP). 
 
The main problem of Greek public finance are structural deficits. Greece has one of the 
oldest populations in Europe, yet the pension system didn’t reflect demographic trends at 
all. Greece had a generous pension system while keeping the retirement age at only 61 
years. Combined with the demographic trend, it was a road to perdition. On top of the 
pension system, Greece has a huge public sector, which together with pension system 
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accounts for 75% of the annual primary balance. (IMF 
Greece has problems with market competition, which is reduced by extensive regulation 
leading to monopolistic behavior. There are about 150 regulated professions in Greece 
including lawyers, architects, or pharmacists. Regulation in most cases allows for creation 
of local monopolies, as the competition is restricted from entering market with existing 
firms. State owned companies often have a dominant position on the market, which 
influence both competitors and consumers, as it leads to increased prices, decreased 
choice, and quality of products.  
The only Greek problem related to the EU is Schengen. Greece serves as a transition 
country for tens of thousands immigrants coming annually through Turkey from various 
countries like Iran, Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria, or Afghan.  
 
4.4 Saving Greece at all costs 
 
Right after the start of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 initiated by Greek 
illiquidity or rather an insolvency, there was an imminent risk of contagion. Whilst the 
financing troubles of Ireland and Portugal were inevitable, it was crucial to protect 
economies of Italy and Spain, as their possible financing issues would have exceeded 
European capacities. European banking sector was severly weakekned after the credit 
crunch in the United States and it might not withstand a sovereign default. In order to 
protect Europe from serial defaults of both banks and sovereigns it was important to step 
in and stabilize European finances. Possible Greek bailout is not feared for the cross 
border exposition, as the most of the Greek debt is held by Greek banks, but it is for the 










4.4.1 Greek Loan Facility 
 
After start of the Greek debt crisis, there was no EU facility that could help it to deter a risk 
of bankruptcy and IMF itself wasn’t able to provide enough funds. In March 2010 all 
Eurozone Members except for Slovakia agreed on the emergency loan. For a non-
existence of immediate alternatives, the financial help was negotiated in form of bilateral 
loans. Those bilateral loans are pooled into €80 bn package, which is being released in 
scheduled installments and administered by EU. Eurozone cooperates on the loan with 
IMF and ECB. IMF participates by €30 bn (SDR 26,4 bn) in form of a Stand-By 
Arrangement, making the theoretical ceiling for Greek rescue package of upto €110 bn. 
Only four month after the long awaited Treaty of Lisbon became effective, it has been 
already distorted by using Article 122.2 as a justification for providing bailout to troubled 
Greece. Bail-out plans calculated with the option that Greece will be able to access capital 
markets by the end of 2012, which happened to be highly exaggerated assumption less 
than a year later. The initial loan had an average interest 5,2% and maturity 3,5 years. 
(European Commision 2010) 
 
 
Table 11: Greek loan disbursement 
 
Disbursements Euro-area IMF Total 
    
May 2010 14.5 5.5 20.0 
Sept 2010 6.5 2.5 9.0 
Dec 10 / Jan 11 6.5 2.5 9.0 
March 2011 10.9 4.1  15 
July 2011 8.7 3.3 12 
Total 47.1 17.9 65 
           Source:  European Commission (2011d). 
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4.4.2 Conditions of the bailout 
 
As with other loan facilities, the loan is subject to strict conditionality. Disbursement of the 
loan is made on a quarterly basis and prior to disbursements will be compliance of 
conditions reviewed by the Commission, IMF, and ECB. (Conditions 11.4. 2010.) 
Conditions consist of a strict austerity plan and economic reforms. Greek government 
needed to increase revenues and decrease cut spending. Value-added taxes were 
increased from 10 to 11% and from 21 to 23%, and new taxes were imposed on 
cigarettes, alcohol, and fuel. Tax increase was expected to yield extra €800 millions in 
2010. Public wages were cut by €1,1 bn in 2010 and the public sector employment and 
expenditures need to be reduced over following years. Part of the fiscal adjustment plan is 
a partial deregulation of professions and privatization. Important is the reform of pension 
system as the current system is unsustainable. Retirement age was increased from 61 to 
65 years and pensions were reduced in 2010. Starting 2011 pensions should be frozen for 
several years. Budget deficit target for 2010 was set to 8,1% and revenues should have 
increased by 0,5% and expenditures reduced by 2%. In following years the plan projects 
higher revenues (over 3,5%) and bigger revenue cuts (over 3,1%) and both further 
increasing upto 6,6% in 2014.  (European Commission 31.5.2010) 
After the condition review at the beginning of 2011, Greece was criticized for slow 
implementation of reforms. Furthermore government revenues in 2010 increased less than 
expected, because there was a decrease in consumption and economy stood in a deep 
recession. After several downgrades by rating agencies and continuing recession, it 
became clear, that Greece wouldn’t be able to return to capital markets in 2012. In March 
2011 maturity of the Greek loan was extended from initial 3,5 years to 7,5 years and 













Table 12: Greek economic development 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP growth 1.02 -2.05 -4.54 -3.04 1.08 
Inflation 4.24 1.35 4.70 2.54 0.50 
Unemployment 7.68 9.38 12.46 14.76 14.97 
Budget deficit -9.54 -15.37 -9.57 -7.39 -6.23 
Current account -14.69 -10.99 -10.45 -8.16 -7.06 
 
Source: IMF; 2011 & 2012 figures are IMF estimates. 
 
4.4.3 New Austerity 
 
Since the first bailout the economic situation of Greece improved just a little. Economy is 
still in a recession and unemployment still increases. Budget deficit in 2010 breached the 
8,1% target. Situation in Greece worsened in June 2011 during the condition review, which 
found out that Greece is seriously missing targets of the fiscal adjustment program. There 
were massive and violent protests in Greece and the Prime Minister offered resignation, 
but in the end only a Minister of Finance was replaced.  
In order to obtain further disbursements of the financial help, Greek government had to 
pass a new austerity measures. New austerity package was approved by a tight majority 
of 155 out of 300 Members of Parliament at the end of June 2011. If the package wasn’t 
passed, it would mean an immediate default, because Greece had enough finances only 
till the middle of July. New austerity measures and reforms were a condition to 
disbursement of another part of the Greek loan and a precondition to receiving a new 
financial assistance from EU and IMF. The new austerity package consists of increase of 
taxes, further government expenditure cuts, and extensive privatization. Greece has 
increased taxes on alcohol, petrol, cigarettes and imposed new taxes on luxury goods and 
a temporary “solidarity tax” reaching of up to 5% of salary. Wages in public sector should 
be further slashed by 15% and government should decrease expenditures on military, 
healthcare and social security system. Moreover, 150 000 jobs in public sector should be 
cut. Greece hopes it will obtain by this austerity €28 bn over following 5 years. 
Greece has introduced a bold privatization plan to raise €50 bn until 2015. Just in 2011 
Greek government hopes to privatize assets worth €15 bn. Greece promised to privatize 
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part of its assets, which is a condition for further external financing. It has introduced a vast 
privatization scheme, which will be supervised by an independent committee with a EU 
supervisor in order to make the privatization transparent and efficient. Greece has a lot of 
property and shares in numerous state-owned companies.. It owns shares in a great 
variety of companies –mobile carrier OTE, lottery company OPAP, airports, railways, 
power generation company PPC, or military manufacturer EAS and many others. The 
main problem is that majority of those firms are indebted. Unfortunately, Greece has no 
central register of state-owned assets, so the final outcome might differ significantly. 
Another issue is the speed of privatization. Such a fire sale will result in much lower 




Sovereign default can have a numerous forms ranging in severity of loss to creditors. 
Within the framework of the European debt crisis, it is necessary to follow the definition of 
rating agencies, because they might have a different view on classification of a credit 
event. Standard & Poor’s rating agency defines sovereign default as follows: 
“Sovereign is in default in any of the following circumstances: 
 
• For local and foreign currency bonds, notes and bills issued by the central government 
and held outside the public sector of the country, a sovereign default occurs when the 
central government either fails to pay scheduled debt service on the due date or tenders 
an exchange offer of new debt with less favorable terms than the original issue.  
 
• For local currency issued by the central bank, a sovereign default takes place when 
notes are converted into a new currency of less-than-equivalent face value. 
 
• For private-sector bank loans incurred by the central government, a sovereign default 
occurs when the central government either fails to pay scheduled debt service on the due 
date or negotiates a rescheduling of principal and/or interest at less favorable terms than 
under the original loan with the bank creditors.”  (Standard & Poor’s, 2011) 
 
Although Greece has de facto defaulted in May 2010, when it needed to refinance about 
€20 bn of its maturing sovereign debt and lost an access to capital market thanks to 
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increasing interest rates on Greek sovereign bonds, reaching far over the perceived 7% 
sustainability limit. (Baldwin et al. 2010) The factual default was averted until July 21st 
2011, when European officials and private investors agreed on a selective default. Even 
though the participation in debt restructuring is on the voluntary bases, it offers “less 
favorable terms” to creditors, which is an S&P’s definition of sovereign default. Similarly to 
the Brady bonds introduced in Latin American debt crisis, private investors can exchange 
their existing bonds for bonds with an extended maturity, or use other options. The total 
involvement of private investors is estimated at €106 bn between 2011-2016. 
Selective default is a part of a new financial assistance to Greece. The new package 
reaches €109 bn with a maturity between 15 and 30 years and interest of 3,5%. Maturity of 
debt provided by the previous financial assistance will be extended from 7,5 years to at 
least 15 years. Part of the rescue package is a bank recapitalization and guarantees 
scheme reaching €55 bn in total. Compared to previous assistance this one will be shared 
only between IMF and EFSF. The financial assistance will be accompanied by EU 
investment program through European Investment Bank and other facilities to stimulate an 
economic growth. (European Commission 21.7.2011) 
There were attempts of Finland to collateralize the new loan, by Greek public assets, but it 
didn’t pass through. 
 
4.6 Outlook of Greece 
 
The main problem of the international financial assistance and Greek austerity plans is the 
fact that neither Greek citizens, nor markets have a faith in them. Both Greece bond yields 
and CDS spreads are rising. Lack of confidence in the rescue plans results in ongoing 
bank run. Yet the situation hasn’t reached a critical level, but it could possibly destroy 
already weakened banking sector in Greece. According to Bank of Greece clients have 
withdrawn more than 9,5% of deposits since the beginning of the year 2011.  
 
Table 13: Greek Deposits 
 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 
Households -3,427 259 -2,694 -1,531 -3,315 -1,400 -4,734 
Total -4,632 701 -2,021 -1,216 1,647 -5,825 -14,167 
 
Source: Bank of Greece (2011), (millions of EUR). 
 
 58 
Part of Greeks withdraws money to compensate for a decreased real income. Others are 
afraid of possible bankruptcies of banks or believe that Greece will leave Eurozone and 
Drachma would afterwards depreciate, so they would lose a part of their savings. Deposits 
are usually transferred abroad, often to Switzerland.  
Problems of Greek economy started after 1974 and it will take many years more to 
stabilize the economy. Greece needs to stay committed to structural reforms and keep 
tight fiscal policies. There were some arguments if Greece was better off by leaving the 
Eurozone, but it would solve only part of the problem. Greece doesn’t have a problem with 
Euro, but with a low competitiveness, weak institutions and a desperate state of public 
finance. Moreover after the currency reform, Greece would be more vulnerable to 
speculative attacks. If Greece defaulted even tougher austerity and balance budget would 
need to follow. The question remains why markets or rating agencies didn’t penalize 
Greece earlier. Serious problems of Greek economy are known since 2004 and yet 
nothing happened until the start of sovereign debt crisis. Stability and Growth pact failed 




















5. Other Eurozone economies in jeopardy 
 
Even though Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are so far the only Eurozone countries relying 
on external financial assistance, situation can change with a speed of lightning. Several 
other Members are vulnerable to the threat of contagion. There are several sources of 
possible contagion. As the situation of Greece was partially solved by selective default, it 
might have some negative effects on Portugal and Ireland by increasing pressure on their 
default. Even though EBA stress test showed that the European banking sector is in a 
decent shape, test conditions were once again criticized for being too soft. The real state 
of the banking sector might be much worse than the stress test suggests. Further 
worsening of interbank market would cause another liquidity crisis, which might be beyond 
a capacity of ECB. Full scale banking crisis might cause a domino effect and it might be a 
European Lehman Brothers moment. Last, but not least there are risks of default in the 










Portugal was the third Eurozone Member that was forced to seek a bailout. Portugal was 
being pushed for several months to accept the bailout, because there was a real danger of 
contagion to neighboring Spain. Despite the external pressure to accept help, there was 
also an internal. Banks threatened government to accept help otherwise they would stop 
buying government bonds. The reason why Portugal persistently refused the bailout might 
be its experience with IMF during Portuguese economic crises in 70’s and 80’s. Portugal 
was forced to ask for bailout in April 2011 because it needed to refinance part of maturing 








In 2010 Portuguese parliament approved strict austerity measures. Prior to the bailout 
Portuguese Prime Minister José Socrates tried to pass a further austerity measures in the 
parliament, but it was slashed by opposition. In reaction to unsuccessful attempt to impose 
austerity measures, Portuguese rating was downgraded and as a reaction bond yield rose 
above the sustainable level. Additionally, government failed to meet target budget deficit in 
2010 of 7,3% and the deficit was 8,6% instead.  
The total amount of bailout is €78 bn and it is equally shared between EFSF, EFSM, and 
the IMF funds. Unlike Greece and Ireland, Portugal is required to lower its budget deficits 
below 3% till 2013, which is a year earlier. The loan has a maximum maturity of 7,5 years 
and average interest will be 5,7%. The bailout is conditioned by austerity measures. 
Wages in public sector needs to be cut by 5%, and taxes will be increased, some state 
owned companies will be privatized. Furthermore Portugal needs to improve labor market 
flexibility and undergo structural reforms. Unlike Ireland or Spain, in Portugal there was no 
property bubble, but the banking sector is weakened, because the private sector in 
Portugal is heavily indebted. Portuguese bank rely on the liquidity support from ECB. Part 
of the bailout package (€12 bn) is set for bank recapitalization. (ECOFIN 17.5. 2011) 
Austerity measures were followed by countrywide protests and strikes. 
Like Greece, problems of Portugal started decades ago after the Carnation Revolution. 













Portugal joined the Eurozone from the beginning in 1999. Lack of structural reforms and 
access to a cheap lending caused the increasing sovereign debt. Once again the biggest 
problem of Portugal is a lack of motivation to undergo reforms.  
Portuguese bailout plan was criticized for being too soft, compared to Ireland or Greece. 
The reason is that Portugal implemented some austerity measures before it asked for the 
bailout. Alternative explanation is a conflict of interest. President of the European 
Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso is a former Portuguese Prime Minister, so he is 
motivated to apply softer approach towards Portugal. His patriotism was proved when he 
angrily criticized Portuguese rating downgrade by Moody’s agency. (Stearns 2011) 
In June 2011 were general elections in Portugal and José Zapatero’s social party lost to a 
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right wing. New Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho promised to go beyond the rescue 
package with privatization and reforms.  It might be only cheap promises, but he has a 




Almost from the very beginning of the Sovereign Debt Crisis, Italy was branded as a 
member of PIIGS. After Greece, Italy is the biggest European debtor and one of the 10 
biggest in the world, measured by its debt-to-GDP burden. Yet its position is rather 
different compared to majority of other indebted countries. Sovereign debt of Italy is quite 
similar to the situation of Japan. Even though Japan has an enormous sovereign debt, 
there are little concerns from markets, because most of the Japanese debt is held by 
domestic investors. Similarly, majority of Italian sovereign debt is held by Italian investors, 
thus we haven't seen so intense reaction of capital markets compared to other countries 
from the PIIGS group - Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Even though all PIIGS countries 
share some similarities, Italy and Spain for instance are much bigger economies compared 
to the rest of the bunch.  
 
Figure 20: GDP compared to the Eurozone 
 
  
Source: Eurostat, (2010). 
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Italian economy is almost seven times bigger than economies of Greece or Ireland and 
Italy has about six times higher the absolute amount of debt than Greece. More 
importantly, Italy has the biggest sovereign bond market in Europe and the third biggest in 
the world (The Economist 14.7. 2011). If the Italian economy got into serious troubles, it 
would affect severely not only the European economy, but also the entire global economy. 
Similarly to Belgium, Italy had a very high amount of debt from the 90’s, but unlike Belgium 
Italy hasn’t substantially lowered its debt burden to get closer to the 60% debt target set by 
Maastricht Treaty. 
According to Eurostat, in 2009 Italy had a budget deficit of 5,4%, but managed to stabilize 
the deficit for 2010 with a 4,6% being bellow the 5% target. Moreover Italian primary 
balance has improved from - €11,3 bn in 2009 to - €1 bn in 2010, but still it is much lower 
than the positive primary balance of €38,6 bn in 2008. All of this thanks to the Italian 
Minister of Finance, Giulio Tremonti. Only because of him, Italy managed to stabilize 
deficits and is still able to roll-over its huge sovereign debt. Italy has approved some 
austerity measures in 2010, but as the 2011 was the year of local elections in Italy, those 
measures were just mild. Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, didn’t want to make 
austerity too strict, as it is highly unpopular among voters. In the end, Berlusconi’s political 
party has lost in 2011 elections.  
After the elections Italian government was supposed to adopt another and much more 
strict set of austerity measures, but Berlusconi criticized in public both the reform package 
and the Financial Minister Tremonti. It went so far that Tremonti made a threat that if the 
austerity package doesn’t pass, he will resign. Such a behavior of Berlusconi was 
immediately punished by markets and contributed to rating downgrade warning by the 
Moody’s rating agency. Another adverse factor for markets was presentation of new 
banking stress test by the EBA in July 2011. Several Italian banks were thought to be 
vulnerable to adverse economic development in Europe including the biggest, Unicredit 
Bank, but all of them passed the critical part of the test. Italian banks hold around €150 bn 
of Italian sovereign debt, so the health of banking sector is closely monitored by markets. 
After Moody’s threat to downgrade the rating of Italy, the cost of debt financing for Italy has 
become the highest since the 1997. The cost of the new 6M bond issue rose by almost 
20% from 1,657% to 1,988%. (Sanati 2011) Also the CDS spread has increased 
dramatically. Part of the reasons for increased CDS are recent downgrades of Portugal 





Figure 21: CDS of Italy 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg [Accessed 17.7. 2011]. 
 
After such a strong market response, government swiftly passed the new austerity 
package and it was approved by parliament in a record time. Austerity measures should 
save around €48 bn between 2011 and 2014. Italian government plans to achieve a 
balanced budget by 2014. Even though by economic performance Italy belongs among 
countries of the core, it has many problems typical for peripheral countries. Italy has some 
structural problem. The biggest one is the staggering differences between the north and 
the south of Italy, which also creates a significant political tension. Another Italian problem 
is a high immigration and tax evasion. According to government estimates the tax evasion 
accounts for €120 bn in 2010. Unemployment has increased from 6,2% in 2007 to 8,2% in 
2011Q1. It is quite high, but compared to other PIIGS countries it is much lower and even 









Table 14: Labor productivity of Italy 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Italy -1.6 -3.6 2.0 0.4 0.8 
Euro Area -0.4 -2.3 2.2 1.6 1.3 
   
Source: OECD, ( y/y change). 
 
From the table above can be noticed, that Italy has also problems with productivity. Italy is 
lacking behind the Eurozone average in the growth of labor productivity. If Italy manages 
to persuade investors that its austerity plan is going to work, then it should be able to 
withstand the Debt Crisis with no bigger harm. On the other hand if it fails and rating 
agencies or investors lose confidence, it would cause catastrophic consequences. Not 
























Unlike other PIIGS countries, Belgium is not a peripheral country and managed to escape 
the full attention of media and investors. Despite the huge amount of sovereign debt of 
Belgium, markets are still not worried and Belgian risk premium paid for sovereign bonds 
stays low.  
 




Source: Bloomberg (17.7. 2011) 
 
One of the possible explanations is the long history of Belgian debt burden. Since the 90’s 
Belgium has had an extraordinary high debt-to-GDP ratio. In 1995 Belgian debt was 130% 
of GDP, yet Belgium managed to stabilize the debt. During the preparation period before 
creation of the Euro Area, Belgium managed to negotiate an exception from the 
convergence criteria similarly to Italy, and Greece later on. In 1999 Belgium and Italy had a 
debt-to-GDP reaching 113,7%, which was way over the agreed 60% level required by the 
Maastricht Treaty. Belgian government had to promise to gradually decrease its sovereign 
debt during the following years. As can be seen in the graph bellow, Belgian commitment 
remained strong for more than a decade. Belgian debt hasn’t increased until the start of 
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the Financial Crisis in 2007. Belgian debt-to-GDP ratio used to be the highest in Euro 
Area, but in the last decade it has been surpassed by Italy and Greece. 
 




Despite the amount of sovereign debt, Belgian economy is in a decent shape and unlike 
many other Eurozone Members it remained competitive. In 2010 it has grown by almost 
4,1% and according to Eurostat its prediction for growth is 4,3% in 2011 and 4,31% in 
2012. The only problem is that such a growth is quite high and it will create an inflation 
pressure. In July 2011 ECB has increased interest rates by 25bp to 1,5%, but it doesn’t 
seems to be enough for Belgium and another countries like Germany, which are growing 
by more than 4%.  
Nowadays the biggest concerns of investors are a lack of proper government. Belgium 
holds the world record for having the longest period without a government previously held 
by Afghanistan. There are two competing political parties of Flemish and Walloons, which 
have almost an equal support. As a result of divided Belgian society, Belgium has had no 
government ever since the elections in May 2010 that resulted in a stalemate situation. 
Contemporary interim government has just a limited mandate and it might result in 
numerous issues if the market situation deteriorates and Belgium will need to take 
immediate reform or austerity actions. 
Another reason why still has investors a confidence in Belgium is its ability to quickly react 
to adverse situations if necessary. It has been already proven during the previous period 
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without a government, when Fortis bank got into serious financial troubles and had to be 
nationalized. Such emergency situations work like a unifying element, which makes 
opposing political parties cooperate and react promptly. The future of Belgium depends on 







Spain, similarly to Italy, perfectly fits the notion of “too big to fail”. Economy of Spain is the 
fourth biggest in the Eurozone. On the first sight, Spain seems to have no problem with 
sovereign debt. Spanish debt-to-GDP ratio used to be one of the lowest in the whole 
Eurozone and in the last decade it hasn’t crossed the 60% level until 2010.  
 
Figure 24: Spanish debt vs. Eurozone 
 
Source: Eurostat, Note: Debt-to-GDP. 
 
Even though the past development of Spanish debt is quite remarkable, the speed of debt 
increase since the start of the Financial Crisis is alarming. According to IMF between 2007 
and 2011 the debt will increase by 30% of GDP. Similarly to Ireland, Spain used to have a 
balanced budget before the Crisis. Over the last decade Spain had a decent real GDP 
growth above the Eurozone average, but paid for it by a higher inflation. 
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Figure 25: GDP growth and inflation of Spain and Eurozone 
 
Source: IMF, Note: Constant prices; 2011 figures are IMF estimates 
 
The main reason behind the economic crisis in Spain is the construction sector. During the 
boom, economy of Spain was performing well and people got richer. Shortly, there was an 
excessive demand for real estates and developers started building all over the Spain. 
Overheated property market in Spain was further pushed by banks and mainly by unlisted 
savings banks (Cajas) as they were supporting developers and granting mortgages 
willingly. Spanish economy became overly dependent on the construction industry, which 
at its peak employed about 13% of all labor. After the Credit Crunch came to Europe, real 
estate bubble burst and economy slowed down. Subsequent decrease in construction 
further worsened unemployment in Spain, which reached 20,1% in 2010 compared to 
8,3% in 2007. Such a high unemployment creates a pressure on social security system 
and thus on the whole public finance. All of sudden, Spain had to face budget deficits of 
11,1% in 2007 followed by 9,2% in 2010 and IMF estimates the deficit for 2011 at 6,2%, 
which is a little over he 6% government target. 
Unlike other countries, in Spain 17 regional governments decide a large share of public 
spending. As a result, it is quite cumbersome to effectively reduce public spending. 
Several regions like Barcelona or Catalunia has substantially increased debt beyond the 
government debt target of 1,3% of GDP. Since the GDP of Catalunia itself equals the GDP 
of Portugal Spanish government is afraid it might not meet the 6% deficit target this year. 
(Mallet 2011) Spanish national debt is still bellow the EU average and also compared to 
the USA, or the UK. Problem is that the economic growth is negligible since the start of 
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recession in 2008 and unemployment is sky high, especially the youth unemployment 
being over 45%. Contributing factor to unemployment is the wage indexation, which makes 
the wages increase even though the economy is stagnating, thus further lowers the 
competitiveness of Spanish economy. 
Real-estate bubble has seriously weakened the Spanish banking sector. As the savings 
banks are unlisted, it is hard to estimate the exposure of Cajas to bad debts and thus 
markets are quite nervous about the future development in Spain. In February 2011 
government decided to take preventive step and ordered to banks and Cajas to increase 
their core Tier 1 capital to 8% and 10% respectively. Higher capital requirements for cajas 
were justified by a lower capacity and a higher involvement of cajas in the construction 
industry and mortgages. Those banks that will fail to increase the capital will be 
nationalized or merged with a bigger bank. Government pumped €15 bn of capital in 
convertible shares to banking sector through the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring 
(Central Bank of Spain, July 2011). By that time government estimated that about €20 bn 
more will be required, but some estimates were much less optimistic. (The Economist 3.2. 
2011) New stress test carried out by the European Banking Association (EBA) has shown 
that five Spanish banks failed to meet 5% capital requirements and in adverse scenario 
without an increase of capital since December 2010, it might be even nine banks 
(Appendix 1). Right after the July 2011 stress test report, Central Bank of Spain has 
announced that the capital increase after February 2011 was sufficient and no Spanish 
bank will be required to increase its capital (Appendix 2). 
Spain has lost its AAA rating during the Crisis. Because of the weakness of financial sector 
and high deficits of autonomous regions, Spain was in March 2011 further downgraded by 
Moody’s to Aa2 rating. After the downgrade, Spanish prime minister, José Zapatero, 
negotiated with China it will keep buying Spanish bonds to decrease the rising CDS and 
bond yields. (Wang 2011) In the following picture can be seen, that Spanish CDS has 
reached its maximum after disclosure of EBA stress test on July 15th, but now the panic 










Figure 26: CDS of Spain 
 
Source: Bloomberg, [Accessed 18.7. 2011]. 
 
Spain has quite high exposition towards Portugal and tight economic connections. 
Because of that France, Germany and ECB were pushing on Portugal to accept bailout. 
As was mentioned before, Spain is too-big-to-fail, but on the other hand also can be “too-
big-to-be-saved”, because European Union might not have enough funds to bail it out. 
In order to fight the crisis, Spain needs to undergo major reforms. It is crucial to foster 
economic growth, stabilize public finance and decrease unemployment. Spain has already 
accepted a strict austerity plan, which is followed by numerous protests. Austerity was so 
unpopular, that Zapatero’s Socialists have lost election in May 2011 to the conservative 
People’s Party. Despite the high economic growth during the past decade, Spain had 







6. Case studies summary 
 
Despite all PIIGS countries are treated as a one compact group the reality is radically 
different. PIIGS phenomenon itself is just a media image and it should be taken too 
seriously. Case studies shown that differences among countries outnumber similarities. 
Table bellow illustrates, that those countries should be rather divided into different sub-
groups according to broader similarities, not just according to the amount of government 
debt. 
 
Table 15: Economic comparison 
	  
Unemployment	   Real	  GDP	  growth	   Gross	  debt	   Primary	  balance	  
	  
2007	   2011	   2007	   2011	   2007	   2011	   2007	   2011	  
Germany	   8.4	   6.6	   2.78	   2.54	   64.9	   80.0	   2.7	   -­‐0.3	  
Belgium	   7.5	   8.4	   2.79	   1.71	   84.2	   97.1	   3.3	   -­‐0.5	  
Italy	   6.2	   8.6	   1.48	   1.05	   103.6	   119.0	   3.3	   0.2	  
Ireland	   4.6	   14.5	   5.63	   0.55	   25.0	   96.1	   0.3	   -­‐7.5	  
Greece	   8.3	   14.8	   4.28	   -­‐3.04	   105.1	   142.0	   -­‐1.9	   -­‐0.9	  
Portugal	   8.1	   11.9	   2.39	   -­‐1.51	   62.7	   83.3	   -­‐0.1	   -­‐1.6	  
Spain	   8.3	   19.4	   3.57	   0.83	   36.1	   60.1	   3.0	   -­‐4.6	  
 
Source: IMF, (2011 figures are IMF estimates). 
 
All countries from covered by case studies links the fact, that they are highly vulnerable to 
loss of confidence by capital investors. It can be ilustrated on the example of Portugal, as 
its sovereign debt used to be bellow the Euro Area average. As the Portugese economy 
got into recession and underwent rating downgrades, capital markets lost a confidence in 
Portugal and it became the third country that had to apply for emergency funding to roll 
over the sovereign debt. Spain could face a similar destiny like Portugal, because Spanish 
economy has anemic growth, and Spain suffer from extraordinary high unemployment. 
Spanish debt is rapidly rising because of the high unemployment, which pressures on 
social security system and creates primary deficits. This is the case of all four GIPS 
countries facing high unemployment rates. Both Spain and Ireland were hit by a housing 
bubble. Spain similarly to Ireland has a large banking system, but luckily Spanish banks 
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didn’t loose as much in relative terms as did the Irish banks. Investors are still vigilant to 
the informations about the Spanish banking. Especially Cajas savings bank are threatened 
by low capacity to absorb losses. The newest stress test showed that the Spainish banking 
system is the weakest one, but so far the Spanish government managed to recapitalize 
exposed banks and the government is ready to nationalize or merge weak financial 
institutions. Spanish governemnt was lucky not to guarantee for bank deposits. So far the 
situation of Spanish banking system is stabilized. On the other hand, in case of some 
adverse economic event Spanish bond yields can increase during several weeks to 
unssutainable levels. As the Spanish economy is about seven times larger than the 
economy of Ireland, it can absorb bigger shocks. It must be noted, that the nomial debt of 
Spain is four times larger than the debt of Ireland and the theoretical bailout package might 
be beyond the current capacity of rescue funds.  
Ireland is a unique case compared to other reviewed countries. Irish debt problems are 
only a result of poorly handled banking crisis. Irish banking sector bacame an economic 
death trap as it was out of scale compared to the economy. Ireland was a tax heaven for 
financial instutions and also the regulation wasn’t so strict, just like in Iceland. Irish 
business model is criticaly dependent on exports, so with the world-wide recession Irish 
economy significantly slowed down and the unemployment rocketed up. On the other 
hand, Irish external trade balance of goods remains the third highest in the Eurozone and 
way above the EU average. Irish economy works, but the public finance is suffocating with 
the banking crisis. 
The biggest threat for the Eurozone would be the contagion of Italy. Italian economy is the 
third biggest in Europe and the Italian financial market is one the most important in the 
world. Italy struggles with a small economic growth and the already high sovereign debt 
increases. The rise of unemployment in Italy is much lower than in GIPS countries, so the 
pressure on public finance is not as high. Like Greece Italy faces high tax evasion. 
Greek debt crisis was the trigger to the European sovereign debt crisis. Greece has 
serious structural problems, weak institutions and low competitveness. All of these 
problems date some 40 years back, when Greek government started the economic suicide 
through intensive populism and nationalization. Greece managed to enter the Eurozone 
using accounting tricks and forgered statistics covering the real budget deficits and size of 
the sovereign debt. Even though the cheating of statistics was revealed in 2004, nothing 
has changed since then and the similar situation repeated in 2009 only with the difference 
that during the financial crisis it had catastrophic consequences. The only thing that has 
changed with the Greek accession to the Eurozone was the cost of debt funding. Greece 
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got an access to cheaper funding and as result Greek budget deficits increased every year 
and so did the sovereign debt. 
Belgium was one of the very few countries which commited to lowering of debt burden and 
kept the promise. The only real threat for Belgium is its provisory government which has a 
limited mandate. Belgian economy returned to growth and Belgian CDS remains about ten 
times lower compared to Greece. Nowadays there is a low probability that Belgium would 
need a bailout.  
More than a year has passed since the outbreak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Hundreds of billions of Euro were spent and yet the end of the Crisis is out of sight and the 
situation seems to be he same as was on the beginning. The main purpose of the bailout 
plan was to protect the Spain, Italy and Italy from contagion. So far only three countries 
were forced to apply for financial assistance. Spain is threatened by slow recovery and 
high unemployment. Even though the Spanish authorities claim that the banking sector is 
fully capitalized, the reality might be rather different. Italy is in the mercy of investors and 
rating agencies. If the Italian austerity plans turn out to be credible, Italy will be safe. 
 
6.1 Role of the Euro in the Debt Crisis 
 
During the Credit Crunch and following Financial Crisis, naturally there has been a lot of 
effort put in finding causes – someone or something to blame. Everyone was pointing 
fingers either to central banks, national regulators, investment funds, rating agencies, or 
financial instruments like credit default swaps and mortgage-backed securities. No matter 
what has been the real cause, the biggest victims of every financial crisis are common 
people. Unsurprisingly a rather similar attitude follows the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis. Many Europeans thing that the Euro currency is responsible for the Debt Crisis. It is 
a reasonable assumption as all bailouts were Eurozone Members. They argue, that debt 
problems of Eurozone countries would have been more easily fought if they had 
independent national currencies. Some problems might have been solved through 
currency devaluation, but as the Euro has negatives, it has some benefits also. The risk in 
the Eurozone is pooled among all Members, so if for example Greece returned to 
Drachma, it would have been much easier to over speculate. 
Euro is unprecedented project. For the first in the history currency was created sooner 
than the State. Euro is successful, because there has been no devaluation yet. Eurozone 
is a political project, because it still misses some properties of the optimal currency area as 
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was outlined by Mundell and others. The biggest issue is the lack of fiscal transfers. On 
the other the current bailout packages can be perceived as a sort of huge fiscal transfers. 
Moreover the Euro Plus Pact might be seen as a first step towards fiscal federalism. 
6.1.1 Is Euro the cause of crisis? 
 
Thanks to globalism of markets, the financial crisis has fast spread from the United States 
to Europe and hit hard financial and banking sectors. The very first victim was the Republic 
of Iceland. Icelandic economic model was based on numerous tax incentives and low 
regulation of banking sector. Such conditions have lured to Iceland numerous foreign 
banks and as a result right before the Financial Crisis, banking sector was almost ten 
times bigger than the entire economy of Iceland. Iceland tried to recapitalize banks through 
nationalization, but it was a lost fight and Iceland had to default on part of its obligations. 
Another country, which got into serious troubles, was the United Kingdom. Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) suffered substantial losses during the Credit Crunch. The loss of RBS was 
so high, that it instantly became the worst bank in history measured by its annual losses.  
 
Figure 27. Record bank losses 
 
Source: Barr (2011). 
 
Benelux based Fortis Bank, a member of RBS Group was another victim of the crisis and 
had to be nationalized. Another problem of the United Kingdom is its increasing debt. Its 
sovereign debt has almost doubled since the year 2007. 
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Table 16: Sovereign debt of UK vs. Greece 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Increase 
Greece 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 37.4 




From the table above can be seen, that the debt-to-GDP in United Kingdom rose during 
the financial and sovereign debt crisis virtually by the same amount as the Greek debt. 
Among other reasons, United Kingdom has a persistent current account deficit and during 
the Crisis government got involved in the bailout of banking sector, which resulted in such 
an increase of the sovereign debt.  
 
Table 17: Economic outlook of the UK 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real GDP growth 2.788 2.685 -0.065 -4.875 1.251 1.659 2.33 
Inflation 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.1 3.3 4.2 2.0 
Unemployment rate 5.4 5.395 5.551 7.453 7.841 7.833 7.692 
Net lending/borrowing -2.646 -2.674 -4.891 -10.295 -10.441 -8.56 -6.938 
Primary deficit -1.108 -1.096 -3.305 -8.488 -7.815 -5.515 -3.861 
Current account 
balance 
-3.383 -2.597 -1.645 -1.71 -2.492 -2.429 -1.877 
 
Source: IMF, (Percents, 2011 & 2012 figures are IMF estimates). 
 
In order to fight structural deficits, government had to pass a very strict austerity program 
in 2010. In fact those austerity measures were the strictest since the end of the World War 
II. The austerity plan consists of extensive budget cuts reaching £81 bn and including 
decrease of public sector employees by almost 450,000 till 2015, which by no surprise was 
followed by numerous strikes and thousands of people protests across the UK. (Pimlott et 
al. 2010). Last but not least, there was a real-estate bubble in the UK, which burst right 
after the one in the United States in 2008 and there were another bubbles in Australia and 




The real-estate bubble in the USA and subprime mortgages were responsible for the credit 
crunch, which turned into the financial crisis. Financial crisis caused a deep recession in 
the United States, which lasts until today. Recession has caused a deterioration of public 
finance and several States like Illinois or California are facing a severe financing issues 
and a risk of default. Even though the position of those states and their regional 
governments is substantially different from the situation of heavily indebted European 
countries, the main principle stays the same. American states benefit from the fiscal 
federation. Sovereign debt of the United States has rapidly increased over past years.  
 
Table 18: Economic outlook of the Unite States 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real GDP growth 2.673 1.947 0 -2.633 2.834 2.758 2.872 
Inflation 3.222 2.867 3.817 -0.327 1.646 2.173 1.605 
Unemployment rate 4.608 4.617 5.8 9.275 9.633 8.537 7.751 
Net lending/borrowing -2.036 -2.738 -6.477 -12.669 -10.586 -10.793 -7.534 
Primary deficits -0.061 -0.656 -4.514 -10.903 -8.876 -9.034 -5.744 
Current account balance -5.99 -5.107 -4.655 -2.68 -3.208 -3.243 -2.838 
Debt-to-GDP 61.122 62.159 71.222 84.577 91.552 99.519 102.903 
 
Source: IMF, Note: Figures in % and % of GDP. 16.7. 2011 
 
Debt has increased substantially due to enormous bailout of the banking sector. The rest 
accounts for a lack of reforms, recession and attempt to stimulate growth through an 
extensive fiscal expansion. Total amount of national debt is limited by a debt ceiling, which 
is regularly increased when necessary. Since the start of the Credit Crunch, debt has 
increased by 30% of GDP and unemployment has more than doubled. Nowadays, there is 
a sovereign debt crisis in the United States, because opposition blocks further rising of the 
debt limit and government will run out of money by the beginning of August 2011. Rating 
agencies are concerned over the rising debt and made a threat that the sovereign rating 
might be downgraded, which would have serious consequences. 
If we focus back on the European Union, Romania, Hungary, and Latvia were the very first 
countries, which applied for an external funding by the EU through the Balance of 
Payments facility.  
It is crucial to realize, that the European Sovereign Debt Crisis is European and it is a 
crisis of the sovereign debt, not the Euro currency per se. Even though there are some 
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critiques of the Euro claiming that the lack of homogeneity within the Eurozone caused 
real-estate bubbles in Ireland and Spain, it was not the only reason as the same bubbles 
appeared all over the world. There were real-estate bubbles outside of the Eurozone, so 
despite the fact that ECB rates might be sometimes unfavorable to a part of Member 
States, real-estate bubbles can’t be fully avoided through independent monetary policy. 
Neither FED, nor the Bank of England has shown the ability to prevent creation of bubbles 
and none of those countries managed to survive the Financial Crisis without the 
substantial increase of its sovereign debt and a bailout of the banking sector.  
The biggest problem of Eurozone is the lack of motivation to undergo structural reforms 
and keep sound fiscal policies. Some countries like Greece or Portugal were only free-
riding and enjoying merits of the Eurozone without satisfying Maastricht criteria needs to 
be followed only by prospective Members, as the SGP pact fails to enforce fiscal 

























7. Fostering European economic stability 
 
During the financial and debt crisis in Europe, it became apparent that contemporary state 
of Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is unsatisfactory and the Pact needs to be revised. 
Economic situation in Europe nowadays is rather different than it used to be in early 90's. 
European Union is struggling both in terms of stability and growth. Impact of the Financial 
Crisis on Europe was striking. There is no doubt that Europe wasn’t prepared for a crisis of 
such extent. Banking sector showed how weak it was during the crisis and marked the 
importance of performing regular stress test. Overall financial supervision in Europe needs 
to improve. Moreover Europe had no plans regarding increase in competitiveness and 
towards a long-term and sustainable growth as the SGP was aimed at short and medium 
term stability. According to initial believes Euro was a key to a further European integration 
and by its design it was supposed to promote mutual trade and convergence of poorer 
performing countries towards the leading core. For several reasons it didn’t happen. Euro 
itself offer many benefits to Eurozone Members, but from the very beginning some 
countries started to exploit its merits. Maastricht criteria included in the Stability and 
Growth pact soon became rules only to be followed by prospective Members. So as a 
result, prospective Members had tougher conditions than current Members. Simply the 
benefit of cheaper lending was too tempting, especially for poorer countries lacking 
structural reforms like Greece or Portugal. 
 
7.1 SGP update 
 
Stability and Growth Pact was meant to be a safeguard of the stability in the Eurozone. 
The problem is that it has low enforceability, as the so/called excessive deficit procedure 
was deemed non-enforceable after Germany and France breached the Maastricht criteria 
in 2003 and managed to persuade ECOFIN commission to postpone the application of the 
Pact. In March 2011 European Council presented a proposal of an update to the Pact. 
Proposed update targets both preventive and corrective arms of the Pact, leaving the 
excessive deficit procedure intact. Excessive deficit procedure concept will be broadened 
to excessive imbalances procedure targeting the main macroeconomic indicators. If the 
excessive imbalance is identified, Member will be given a recommendation and deadline 
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for correction of the imbalance. If the Member repeatedly fails to comply with the 
recommendation, it will be penalized by an annual sanction of 0,1% of GDP. 
Preventive arm will introduce an expenditure benchmark, which will be used in 
assessment of Members’ medium term objectives. If the Member significantly deviates 
from its medium term objectives it can be sanctioned. 
Corrective arm of the Pact will be significantly strengthened. Every country with a deficit 
above the 60% level set in Maastricht criteria will be required to decrease by average 
annual rate of at least one twentieth of the debt over the three-year period. On the other 
hand, even the update of the Stability and Growth Pact leaves a plenty of maneuvering 
space for Members as the debt rule will be applied only taking into account a broader 
context, such as ageing of population or reform costs. This leaves too many opportunities 
to avoid application of the rule by Member States.  
Sanctions will tightened and paid in the early stage of the excessive deficit procedure. 
When country will be found subject to the EDP, it will have to deposit an amount of 0,2% of 
GDP. If the country manages to reach its deficit targets, the deposit will be returned. 
Otherwise the deficit will be used to cover financial sanctions. If the Member State violates 
the Pact repeatedly, sanctions will gradually increase. Unlike nowadays, the application of 
the sanctions will be automatic and could be reverted only by a qualified majority of the 
Council. (EU 15.3. 2011) 
This proposal means an immense improvement to the functioning of the SGP and by 
automatizing sanctions it decreases risks of political manipulation like we saw in case of 
excessive deficit procedures of Germany and France in 2003. Moreover it broadens the 
scope of the Pact to all major macroeconomic indicators. 
 
7.2 Euro Plus Pact 
 
Euro Plus Pact is meant to be a supplement to the existing Stability and Growth Pact, 
addressing broader aspects of a long-term convergence and competitiveness. It is 
designed especially to increase economic policy coordination among its Members. 
Members are supposed to discuss any major economic reform, which might have a 
spillover effect. Despite it is primarily a designated instrument of Eurozone Countries, it 
has been also accepted by several prospective members - Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, 
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Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. 
The original name of the successor of Stability and Growth pact was Pact for 
Competitiveness. As some aspects of the original Pact for Competitiveness changed 
compared to the original proposition, the name changed to Pact for the Euro and then 
finally to the Euro Plus Pact. Plus in the name indicates that also non-Eurozone countries 
are joining the Pact. According to Hermann von Rompuy, president of the European 
Council, it also indicates that the Pact goes beyond existing treaties and further 
strengthens integration among its Members.  (The Economist, 25.3. 2011) 
The pact will be implemented on a national level and pursue of its goals will be left on 
individual member states, but regularly supervised. The choice of particular policies to 
achieve these goals is left on each member. Progress in fostering competitiveness and 
growth will be assessed every year by Head of state or Government and reported to 
European Commission. Also annually they will set new targets and commitments for 
following year. Success of following promised goals will be measured by benchmarks and 
best practices among all member states. Main targets for countries were set in following 
points: 
 
• Foster competitiveness. The main stress is put on the growth of wages. 
Competitiveness will be measured by the extent to which changes in wages goes 
hand in hand with changes in productivity. As an index will be used unit labor costs 
(ULC). Competitiveness will be measured not only for the whole economy, but also 
for all major sectors. Findings will be confronted with the rest of Eurozone and with 
similar trading partners. Increased attention should be paid to the existing systems 
of wage negotiation, which should be changed if necessary in order to ensure 
growth in competitiveness. Additionally, wages in public sector should set example 
to private sector. Increased productivity should be achieved also through a support 
of small and medium enterprises, including removal of legal and administration 
obstacles. Furthermore protection of certain industries or occupations should be 
lessened or abolished. Last but not least, governments should support education, 
R&D and infrastructure. 
 
• Foster employment. Long-term employment, youth employment and participation 
ratio are the key indicators to be observed. Employment should be supported by 
lifelong learning and tax incentives. Furthermore, so-called “flexicurity” model 
should be promoted. It is an economic policy, which balances between job flexibility 
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and security of transition between jobs. 
 
• Enhance the sustainability of public finances. In order to meet requirements of 
Stability and Growth Pact, governments should take into account several aspects. 
Most importantly, countries should focus on its mandatory expenditures, namely 
pension system, health care system, and social transfers. It is crucial for all 
countries to keep those mandatory expenditures sustainable. Whole Europe 
undergoes demographic implosion and as a result the population is ageing. 
Additionally, the expected life length is increasing. Those two factors combined 
exert immense pressure on fiscal sustainability of contemporary pension and health 
care systems. By this proposition is silently intended, that the retirement age will be 
increased across all member states of the pact. Even more important an 
incorporation of national fiscal rules. It is up to any member how it incorporates in its 
own legislation, but it should be easily enforceable and last for a sufficient time. It 
can take a form of expenditure rule limiting annual budget deficits, or a debt brake. 
The choice of a particular fiscal rule should be consulted with The European 
Commission, which should ensure the compliance with existing EU acquis. 
 
• Reinforce financial stability. In a reaction to financial crisis, EU is improving 
regulation and supervision of financial sector. Members should cooperate with EU 
through national banking legislation. Furthermore, member states commit to 
performing regular banking stress test, which will be coordinated at EU level. EU 
will be also watching over the amount of private debts in banks, non-financial firms, 
and households. Eventual macroeconomic or macro-financial issues will member 
states discuss with presidents of ESRB and Eurozone in order to find an optimal 
solution. 
 
• Tax policy coordination. There is a need to cooperate on common corporate tax 
base to make national tax systems consistent and consequently to improve 
competitiveness of European businesses. Additionally, governments should work 
on limitation of tax evasion and tax frauds and promote an exchange of best 
practices.  





Euro Plus Pact has some controversial aspects for which it is being criticized. The 
preliminary concept of the Pact update was designed by German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and French president Nicholas Sarkozy to suit best their national preferences. It 
might seem quite unfair with a respect to the rest of Eurozone and EU Members, but 
France and Germany both have an unusually strong negotiating position during the 
sovereign debt crisis, so they can pre-negotiate some advantages for their nations. Both 
countries have a keen interest on adoption of the tax clause. Whilst it is officially meant to 
be a protection against tax evasion and frauds, between lines can be noticed it is targeted 
on specific countries like Bulgaria and Ireland having very low corporate taxes. Even 
though the tax clause is very vague and voluntary, Ireland perceives it as a “back-door” to 
tax harmonization. Especially France exerts an immense pressure on Ireland to increase 
its 12,5% corporate tax. Despite the pressure, Irish Prime minister Enda Kenny stated that 
Irish tax is ”unmovable”. (Irish Times, 20.4. 2011) 
Tax clause is not the only source of disputes. Baltic countries claims they cannot comply 
with increasing retirement age, because the average life span in those countries belongs 
to the lowest in Europe. Another case is Luxembourg and Belgium, which oppose abolition 
of wage indexation. Thousands of people across the Europe were protesting against the 
Pact. The biggest concerns for them were related to the abolition of wage indexation and 
fear that social securities and pension plans will be significantly reduced. People feel that 
the Pact gives too much power too employers and are afraid that they will use it to exploit 
their employees. 
  
7.3 European Semester 
 
Improvement of the Stability and Growth Pact allowed implementation of the so-called 
“European Semester”. It is a tool for closer economic policy coordination in the European 
Union. The first semester started on March 2011. European Commission and the Council 
will present at the beginning of each semester targets and issues for the following year. 
Each government is then supposed to present its proposed national reforms, which should 
help overcome presented threats in line with the Europe 2020 plan requirements. Both 
budget and reforms will be then reviewed by the Commission and Council, which will serve 
as advisory bodies. After the review, budget and reforms should be implemented on 
national levels. 
Part of the European Semester is a Europe 2020 strategy. Europe 2020 is a long-term 
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strategic plan for the European Union. As the name suggests, it is a 10 year plan 
addressing five economic areas responsible for the long-term and sustainable economic 
growth. It aims to help unemployed back to work, attract private capital to finance growth, 
increase investments on education and research, and supports a reform of pension 
systems. National progress towards these goals will be assessed based on the following 
target indicators:    
 
“ The 5 targets for the EU in 2020 
 
1. Employment 
75% of the 20-64 year-olds to be employed 
2. R&D / innovation 
3% of the EU's GDP (public and private combined) to be invested in  
R&D innovation 
3. Climate change / energy 
greenhouse gas emissions 20% (or even 30%, if the conditions are right) lower  
than 1990 
20% of energy from renewables 
20% increase in energy efficiency 
4. Education 
Reducing school drop-out rates below 10% 
at least 40% of 30-34–year-olds completing third level education 
5. Poverty / social exclusion 
at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion”  
 
Source: European Commission (2011e). 
 
Each Member State will implement those targets on a national level. Europe 2020 
progress will be monitored during the Euro Semester. European Semester should help 
achieving targets of the Europe 2020 program by focusing on improvement of budgetary 
discipline and macroeconomic stability. Europe 2020 is highly important, because it is the 




7.4 Improved supervision 
With no doubts, without the Financial Crisis spreading from the United States across the 
world, there would be no Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe, or its extent and depth would 
have been significantly reduced. One of the reasons why the sovereign debt crisis is so 
serious is a weakened financial system, which hasn’t fully recovered from the credit crunch 
and financial crisis. Among the key factors, which caused the financial crisis was an 
insufficient financial supervision. Similarly to the United States, European Union had to 
react to such a deficiency and reformed the financial supervision framework. Four new 
supervisory bodies were established in 2010 creating the European System of Financial 
Supervision and becoming operational by January 1st 2011. (European Commission 20.4. 
2011) 
• European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – is the main supervisory body based in 
Frankfurt. As the name suggest, its main scope is to supervise stability of the 
European financial sector and protect it from systemic risks. ESRB is doing so by 
monitoring macroeconomic development. 
• European Banking Authority (EBA) – is a successor body of the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and is based in London. It has numerous 
responsibilities related to supervision of the banking system. The main attention is 
currently focused on stress tests of the European banking sector. EBA will be 
performing stress tests on a regular basis. Stress tests will be tightly coordinated 
with the ECB, ESRB, Member States’ national supervisors and the European 
Commission. Compared to stress test performed by CEBS in July 2010, new stress 
performed by EBA should be more extensive and cover much worse conditions 
compared to CEBS test. CEBS test has been repeatedly criticized for being too soft 
and the worst-case scenario of test being too optimistic. 
• European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) – is an 
authority based in Frankfurt and its main scope is to support stability of the financial 
sector by supervising insurance companies and pension funds. EIOPA replaced the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(CEIOPS). 
• European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) – is an authority based in 
Paris. It replaced a Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and it is 
main scope is to support stability of financial markets by supervising securities 
markets. It closely cooperates with EIOPA and EBA authorities.  
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7.5. Assessment of institutional changes 
 
European Union managed to react on he crisis and created a set of supporting safeguard 
mechanisms that will help to protect the stability both of the Eurozone and the European 
Union. Improved financial market supervision should prevent, or at least lessen, future 
banking crisis. On the other hand some criticism of previous institution still prevails. Even 
though EBA’s banking stress tests are much more strict and realistic than the stress tests 
by CEBS, but they are still too soft. There is a real possibility, that the banking stress tests 
are designed to provide an overall optimistic image of the banking sector.  
EU defined a reasonable long-term development strategy Europe 2020 targeted to provide 
long-term and sustainable growth. Within the Euro Semester and Euro Plus Pact was 
introduced regular cooperation on fiscal policies, which is a stepping-stone for a future 
fiscal union. Even though Germany is against any kind of fiscal transfers, as it rightfully 
fears it will have to pay for everyone else, the fiscal union doesn’t have to provide fiscal 
transfers. It can have a form of a fiscal supervisory body as suggests Wyplosz (2005, 
2008). It would be a fiscal version of independent central bank. Wyplosz hopes such 
institution would eradicate influences of political cycle.  
Such proposals use to be criticized as an interference to state sovereignty. Furthermore 
fiscal policy preferences differ among Members and it is not clear which type of fiscal 
policy should be followed. One way or another, nowadays it is a perfect timing to make 
another step in the process of European integration. Even the Euro Plus Pact goes a step 
further beyond the existing Treaties. 
The biggest problem of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms is motivation. Both are 
extremely unpopular as was seen during the European sovereign debt crisis. People got 
used to budget deficits so much, that they don’t sometimes realize budgets can be in 
surplus. As with any other debt, there is nothing particularly wrong about sovereign debt 
itself. On the other hand debt has to have a proper justification and has to be sustainable 
in the first place. Motivational problem might be solved by the update of SGP pact, which 
imposes much stricter fine under the excessive deficit procedure and macroeconomic 
imbalances procedure. Functioning of the Pact is automated, so it should be free from a 
political bias as was seen in case of EDP of France and Germany. 
By the example of Ireland we can see that having sound public finance is not enough. 
Ireland had extraordinary low debt and ran budget surpluses. In just two years time Irish 
debt quadrupled and budget deficits crossed -30% of GDP. The old glory is long gone. 
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Since the crisis came, now they have one of the highest debts and deficits in Europe.  
Establishment of the ESM fund was a reasonable move as the process of possible future 
bailouts gets automated. The possible risk is once again the motivation of Members. 
Governments might rely on the financial support and seek it regularly.  






























" Beware, If I fall, then Italy falls. If Italy falls, then so falls the euro. It is a chain.“ 
 
(Giulio Tremonti, July 2011)1 
 
More than year has passed and the European sovereign debt crisis is far from being over. 
The reason why it is so hard to find a solution is a political division of the Eurozone. Every 
Member has a slightly different opinion over the ideal solution. As a result, European 
politicians decided to muddle through the crisis, as it is much easier to explain to voters. 
Finding a solution to the crisis is extraordinary complicated, because it is in fact a 
combination of two crises – banking crisis and debt crisis. Banking sector is weakened 
form the credit crunch and as the banking sector holds a large amount of sovereign bonds, 
those two crises are interconnected. Banking sector threatens economic stability and 
sovereign default would severely affect banks. It is a vicious circle and everyone is afraid 
of the Lehman Brothers moment repeating in Europe. Domino effect within banking sector 
or of sovereign defaults would ruin Eurozone, initiate a second financial crisis and threaten 
future of the European integration. Too much is in stake and consequences might be 
catastrophic. On the other hand, the crisis might be a unifying element leading to even 
tighter integration as can be witnessed on the example of the Euro Plus pact. It might even 
open doors to a fiscal federalism. 
Bailout program was supposed to buy enough time for banks till they recapitalize, but for 
several reason it didn’t work. Firstly, recovery of recipient countries is much slower than 
was initially expected. Secondly, the bailout and austerity program is not perceived by 
investors and rating agencies as a credible solution. Rating agencies nowadays have a 
“death switch” as the capital market immediately reacts to sovereign rating downgrades. 
The question is why those agencies didn’t act sooner, prior to the outbreak of the debt 
crisis. European Union wants to diminish their power and establish a European rating 
agency, but there is a great risk of a political bias. 
European Union still tries to find who should pay for the crisis and easiest and the most 
publicly acclaimed is a bank tax, but it is not a wise solution as the European banking 
                                            
1 Censky (2011) 
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sector is weakened from the crisis. 
As the case studies show, Euro is not the source of the crisis. Only in some cases it was a 
contributing factor due to the fact that Eurozone doesn’t satisfy all conditions of the optimal 
currency area. Eurozone project is viable, which can be proved by accession of Estonia 
despite the debt crisis and last but not least, there was so far no Euro devaluation. During 
the crisis Euro has lost against dollar, but it can be perceived even as a positive thing as 
the weaker Euro supports exports. Problems of Eurozone undermined the faith in the 
European integration. Moreover ECB lost its good reputation during the crisis.  
Eurozone is not the only troubled European project. Schengen area is showing some 
weaknesses too. France and Italy argues about trains of immigrants and Denmark 
reinstated border controls, as it fears a cross-border crime. As with the Eurozone, those 
weaknesses don’t mean the project is wrong, only that some details have to be improved.  
The contemporary financial crisis is in some aspects even worse than the ill-famous Great 
Depression of the 30’s, but from the sovereign defaults point of view it is much better. 
According to Cantor and Packer (2005), during the Great Depression, 25 out of 58 
countries defaulted on their international bonds. Nowadays only three sovereigns would 
have defaulted without the international financial help. Sadly, as the Great Depression in 
30’s gave birth to the fascism, and bolstered socialism, nowadays both the right wing and 
the left wing extremists are gaining a political support. In Finland extremistic True Finns 
party ended third in general elections. 
European recovery depends also on the recovery of the world economy. It depends 
whether the United States enter a double dip recession, or if the Chinese economy slow 
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Appendix 1: Bank capital ratios without capital rising 
 
Source: EBA stress test (2011). 
Appendix 2: Solvency ratios 
 
Source: Central Bank of Spain (2011). 
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Appendix 5: ECB contributor key 
 
Country ISO ESM key 
Austria AT 2.783 
Belgium BE 3.477 
Cyprus CY 0.196 
Estonia EE 0.186 
Finland FI 1.797 
France FR 20.386 
Germany DE 27.146 
Greece EL 2.817 
Ireland IE 1.592 
Italy IT 17.914 
Luxembourg LU 0.25 
Malta MT 0.073 
Netherlands NL 5.717 
Portugal PT 2.509 
Slovakia SK 0.824 
Slovenia SI 0.428 
Spain ES 11.904 
Total EA17 100 
	   	   	  
Source: EU (20.4. 2011), pp.34 
 
